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Abstract
This thesis examines the extent and impact of imperfect competition in the labor mar-
ket (monopsony) on several important features of our modern economy. The ﬁrst chapter
describes in detail the justiﬁcation for why monopsony is an important factor in the labor
market. A dynamic model, which identiﬁes the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm from job to
job ﬂows, is the basis for measuring the degree of competition faced by a ﬁrm. This chapter
produces the ﬁrst estimates of ﬁrm-level monopsony ever documented through the use of
linked employer-employee data from the U.S. Census Bureau. The mean (worker-weighted)
labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm is estimated to be 1.08, however there is substantial het-
erogeneity across ﬁrms. Additionally, the model is validated through a series of earnings
regressions, which conclude that a one unit increase in the labor supply elasticity is associ-
ated with an 20 percent increase in the earnings of workers. Finally, through a distributional
decomposition, the impact of imperfect competition is found to be the greatest for low income
workers, and that a more competitive labor market would reduce earnings inequality.
The second chapter focuses on the interaction between ﬁrm-level monopsony and the
gender wage gap. This study estimates a 0.15 gap in the gender-speciﬁc labor supply elastic-
ity averages,. This leads to an approximately 3.3 percent gap in earnings between men and
women, or about 14 percent of the total gender earnings gap solely based on diﬀerences in
mobility. Furthermore, the labor supply elasticity gap is almost entirely due to across ﬁrm
sorting rather than within ﬁrm diﬀerentials.
The third chapter gocuses on how labor market competition changes over the business
cycle, in particular during the great recession. I estimate that the labor supply elasticity
to the ﬁrm declined by approximately 0.19 log points percent (1.20 to 1.01) following the
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. Furthermore, this decline cost workers about 4 percent in earnings.
I also ﬁnd evidence that relatively monopsonistic ﬁrms smooth their employment behavior,
growing at a rate lower than relatively competitive ﬁrms in good economic climates and
higher during poor economic climates.
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Part I
Firm Market Power and the Earnings
Distribution
Abstract
Using the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) data from the
United States Census Bureau, I compute ﬁrm-level measures of labor market (monop-
sony) power. To generate these measures, I extend the dynamic model proposed by
Manning (2003) and estimate the labor supply elasticity facing each private non-farm
ﬁrm in the US. While a link between monopsony power and earnings has traditionally
been assumed, I provide the ﬁrst direct evidence of the positive relationship between
a ﬁrm's labor supply elasticity and the earnings of its workers. I also contrast the dy-
namic model method with the more traditional use of concentration ratios to measure a
ﬁrm's labor market power. In addition, I provide several alternative measures of labor
market power which account for potential threats to identiﬁcation such as endogenous
mobility. Finally, I construct a counterfactual earnings distribution which allows the
eﬀects of ﬁrm market power to vary across the earnings distribution.
I estimate the average ﬁrm's labor supply elasticity to be 1.08, however my ﬁndings
suggest there to be signiﬁcant variability in the distribution of ﬁrm market power across
US ﬁrms, and that dynamic monopsony models are superior to the use of concentration
ratios in evaluating a ﬁrm's labor market power. I ﬁnd that a one-unit increase in the
labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm is associated with earnings gains of between 5 and 20
percent. While nontrivial, these estimates imply that ﬁrms do not fully exercise their
labor market power over their workers. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that the negative earnings
impact of a ﬁrm's market power is strongest in the lower half of the earnings distribution,
and that a one standard deviation increase in ﬁrms' labor supply elasticities reduces
the variance of the earnings distribution by 9 percent.
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1 Introduction
There is good reason to believe that some ﬁrms have non-trivial power in the labor market,
that not all ﬁrms act as price takers and pay their employees the prevailing market wage.
Intuitively, most would not switch jobs following a wage cut of one cent, and we would not
expect a ﬁrm which raises wages by a small amount to suddenly have an inﬁnite stream
of workers. So it becomes an empirical question of whether the departure from perfect
competition is meaningful; whether perfect competition is a good approximation for our
economy, or whether a model with substantial frictions ﬁts better.
The existence of signiﬁcant ﬁrm eﬀects in wage regressions, even after controlling for
detailed person and industry characteristics, is cited as strong suggestive evidence of ﬁrm
market power (Abowd et al., 1999; Goux and Maurin, 1999). For instance, Goux and Maurin
(1999) conclude that on average ﬁrm eﬀects alter an individual's wage by more than 20
percent. Furthermore, they ﬁnd these ﬁrm eﬀects are related more to ﬁrm characteristics
such as size rather than productivity, implying that the ﬁrm eﬀects are not simply absorbing
workers' unmeasured marginal product of labor.
Estimating the degree of wage competition in the labor market is important for both
theoretical research and policy analysis. Since perfect competition is a standard feature
in many models of the labor market, evidence of signiﬁcant distortions in the labor market
would suggest labor economists should reevaluate the perfect competition assumption and its
implications in their models. From a policy perspective, the degree of imperfect competition
can drastically change the eﬀects of institutions such as the minimum wage (Card and
Krueger, 1995) or unions (Feldman and Scheer, 1982).
While the industrial organization literature has theoretically and empirically modeled
similar frictions in the product market, there has been comparatively less work done to ac-
count for distortions of the labor market. This is primarily due to the comparative lack
of rich labor market data (such as linked employer-employee data) versus product market
data. Most of the theoretical work done on this topic resides in the search theory literature,
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with major contributions coming from Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Shimer (2005) to
name a few1. This line of research has given rise to a "new monopsony" literature, popular-
ized by Alan Manning's (Manning, 2003) careful analysis of labor-related topics absent the
assumption of perfect competition. The new monopsony model of the labor market views
a ﬁrm's market power as derived from search frictions rather than solely geographic power
as in a classic monopsony model. These search frictions originate from imperfections in
the labor market such as imperfect information about available jobs, worker immobility, or
heterogeneous preferences.
Even if the existence of monopsony power is accepted, estimating the degree of market
power possessed by a ﬁrm is not a simple task. Economists since Bunting (1962) have
searched for empirical evidence of monopsony, with the predominant method being the use
of concentration ratios, the share of a labor market which a given ﬁrm employs. The most
commonly examined market in the empirical monopsony literature has been that of nurses in
hospitals (Hurd, 1973; Feldman and Scheer, 1982; Hirsch and Schumacher, 1995; Link and
Landon, 1975; Adamache and Sloan, 1982; Link and Settle, 1979). This market lends itself
to monopsony because nurses have a highly speciﬁc form of human capital and there are
many rural labor markets where hospitals are the dominant employer. Despite the relatively
large literature on this narrow labor market, the concentration ratio approach has yielded
mixed results and no clear consensus.
More recently, studies have attempted to directly estimate the average slope of the labor
supply curve faced by the ﬁrm, which is a distinct concept from the market labor supply
elasticity2. Studying the market for nurses, Sullivan (1989) ﬁnds evidence of monopsony
using a structural approach to measure the diﬀerence between nurses' marginal product of
labor and their wages. Examining another market commonly thought to be monopsonistic,
the market for schoolteachers, Ransom and Sims (2010) instrument wages with collectively
1See Mortensen (2003) or Rogerson et al. (2005) for a review of this literature
2The market labor supply elasticity corresponds to the decision of a worker to enter the labor force, while
the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm corresponds to the decision of whether to supply labor to a particular
ﬁrm. This paper focuses on the ﬁrm-level decision.
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bargained pay scales and estimate a labor supply elasticity between 3 and 4. In a novel
approach using German administrative data, Schmieder (2010) ﬁnds evidence of a positive
sloping labor supply curve through an analysis of new establishments.
Using a dynamic approach similar to this study, Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) and Hirsch
et al. (2010) both separately estimate the labor supply elasticities to the ﬁrm of men and
women, each ﬁnding strong evidence of monopsonistic competition. Ransom and Oaxaca
(2010) use data from a chain of grocery stores, and ﬁnd labor supply elasticities of about
2.5 for men and 1.6 for women. Hirsch et al. (2010) uses administrative data from Germany
to estimate elasticities ranging from 2.5-3.6 and 1.9-2.5 for men and women respectively.
Applying this approach to survey data, Manning (2003) ﬁnds labor supply elasticities ranging
from 0.68 in the NLSY to 1.38 in the PSID. In a developing country context, Brummund
(2011) uses a novel structural production function approach, and ﬁnds strong evidence of
monopsony in Indonesian labor markets, estimating labor supply elasticities between 0.6 and
1.0.
Utilizing data from the US Census Bureau's Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics
(LEHD) program, I estimate the market-level average labor supply elasticity faced by ﬁrms in
the US economy, similar to the Hirsch et al. (2010) study using German data. I then extend
the approach to estimate ﬁrm-level labor supply elasticities. This is accomplished through an
extension to the dynamic model of labor supply proposed by Manning (2003). This method
allows me to examine the eﬀects of monopsonistic competition on the earnings distribution
in great detail, and contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, it is
the ﬁrst examination of monopsony power using comprehensive administrative data from
the US. Second, my particular empirical strategy allows me to examine the distribution of
monopsony power which exists in the US, and to provide the ﬁrst direct evidence on the
negative impact of a ﬁrm's market power on earnings. I compare the performance of the
market power measures derived in this study to that of the more traditional concentration
ratio to illustrate the signiﬁcant contribution of the new monopsony models. Finally, I
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construct a counterfactual earnings distribution in which ﬁrms' market power is reduced
in order to demonstrate the impact of imperfect competition on the shape of the earnings
distribution.
I estimate the average labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm to be approximately 1.08. Esti-
mates in this range are robust to various modeling assumptions and corrections for endoge-
nous mobility. Furthermore, I ﬁnd evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the market power
possessed by ﬁrms, ranging from negligible to highly monopsonistic. While a link between
monopsony power and wages has traditionally been assumed (Pigou, 1924), I provide the
ﬁrst direct evidence of a positive relationship between a ﬁrm's labor supply elasticity and the
earnings of its workers, estimating that a one-unit increase is associated with a decrease of at
least 0.09 in log earnings. I demonstrate that the eﬀect of monopsony power is not constant
across workers: unconditional quantile regressions imply that impacts are largest among low
paid and negligible among high paid workers. Finally, implications in the inequality litera-
ture are addressed through the construction of a counterfactual earnings distribution, which
implies that a one standard deviation increase of each ﬁrm's labor supply elasticity would
decrease the variance of earnings distribution by 9 percent.
The paper is organized as follows, Section 2 describes the deﬁnition of market power
utilized in this study. Section 3 lays out the theoretical foundation for this study. The
data and methods are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results and sensitivity
analyses, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Discussion of Monopsony Power
The concept of monopsony was ﬁrst deﬁned and explored as a model by Robinson (1933).
In her seminal work, Robinson formulated the analysis which is still taught in undergraduate
labor economics courses. Monopsony literally means one buyer, and although the term is
most often used in a labor market context, it can also refer to a ﬁrm which is the only buyer
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of an input.
It should be pointed out that in the new monopsony framework, the word monopsony is
synonymous with the following phrases: monopsonistic competition, imperfect competition,
ﬁnite labor supply elasticity, or upward sloping labor supply curve to the ﬁrm. While the
classic monopsony model is based on the idea of a single ﬁrm as the only outlet for which
workers can supply labor, the new framework deﬁnes monopsony as any departure from the
assumptions of perfect competition. Additionally, the degree of monopsonistic competition
may vary signiﬁcantly across labor markets, and even across ﬁrms within a given labor
market.
In order to think about what determines a ﬁrm's monopsony power, we must consider
why we do not observe the predicted behavior from a perfectly competitive model. What
gives a ﬁrm ﬂexibility in oﬀering a wage rather than being forced to oﬀer the market wage?
Put another way, why do we not observe workers jumping from job to job whenever they
observe a higher paying opportunity for which they are qualiﬁed?
One of the most prominent reasons is that the typical worker does not have a continuous
stream of job oﬀers (this point will be discussed further in the theoretical model section).
This source of monopsony power has roots in the classic monopsony framework in that, all
else held constant, workers in labor markets with more ﬁrms are likely to have a greater
number of oﬀers. However, this idea takes an overly simplistic view of the boundaries of
a given labor market. Most employers are likely operating in many labor markets at any
given time. A prestigious university may be competing in a national or international labor
market for professors, a regional labor market for its high-level administrators and technical
staﬀ, and a local labor market for the low-level service workers. Even if the arrival rate
of job oﬀers were the only source of monopsony power, it seems that geographic modeling
alone would do a poor job of measuring that power. Another source of monopsony power
is imperfect information about job openings (McCall, 1970; Stigler, 1962), which is not
completely distinct from the arrival rate of job oﬀers since a decrease in information can
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cause a reduction in job oﬀers. This is a particularly compelling example since studies
such as Hoﬂer and Murphy (1992) and Polachek and Robst (1998) estimate that imperfect
information about job prospects depresses wages by approximately ten percent.
The costs (both monetary and psychic) associated with changing jobs can also be thought
of as giving market power to the ﬁrm. Moving costs are typically thought of as a short run
cost, particularly when a worker is young. However these costs can grow signiﬁcantly when
a worker has a family and roots in a community. Consider the scenario of a dual-career
family. Two job oﬀers will be needed to induce either of the partners to move, a fact which
gives signiﬁcant bargaining power to the employers of each partner, particularly the one who
is paid less. Additionally, changing jobs means that workers must adjust to a new system
which will require at least a small degree of learning on the job.
Firm speciﬁc human capital also can be thought of as giving market power to the ﬁrm,
since there is in eﬀect a barrier to leaving a ﬁrm when an individual's ﬁrm speciﬁc capital is
large relative to their general human capital. In fact, Wasmer (2006) concludes that markets
with substantial search frictions induce workers to overinvest in ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital.
Reputation costs likely also play a large role in the mobility of workers. Potential employ-
ers would be very suspicious of hiring a worker who changes jobs the moment he is oﬀered
any wage increase. For all of these reasons, and likely many more, workers must be selective
with the wage oﬀers they choose to accept, thus leading to a labor market with substantial
frictions.
As discussed in Manning (2011), another way to think about imperfect competition in
the labor market is in terms of the rents received by the employee and the employer. On the
worker's side, the rents to a given job match would be the diﬀerence between the current
wage (utility) and the worker's opportunity cost, either a wage (utility) from a diﬀerent
ﬁrm or unemployment beneﬁts. Studies such as Jacobson et al. (1993) implicitly estimate
these rents by exploring the impacts of exogenous job destruction. This literature estimates
wage losses of 20-30 percent, implying signiﬁcant rents to employees from a given job match.
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From the employer's perspective, the rents from the ith job match are the diﬀerence between
(MPi − wi) and (MPj − wj), where j is the next worker who would be hired if worker i
leaves the ﬁrm. This is a harder quantity to measure empirically, but can be approximated
(assuming that the marginal product is the same for workers i and j) by hiring and training
costs. The estimates of hiring and training costs as a fraction of total wages paid tend to be
in the range of 3-7 percent (Oi, 1962; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003). The ratio of worker rents
to employer rents can be thought of as a measure of the ﬁrm's market power. If the worker's
opportunity cost is high relative to her employer's opportunity cost, then the employer will
be able to extract a large amount of the surplus from the job match. However, if the converse
is true, the worker will be in the position of power.
A relatively new branch of labor economics which focuses on the initial labor market
conditions when a worker enters the labor market may also provide insight into the mobility
of workers. A number of studies (Oyer, 2006, 2008; Genda and Kondo, 2010; Kahn, 2010)
ﬁnd persistent and negative wage eﬀects from entering the labor market in a bad economy,
lasting for at least 20 years. These persistent eﬀects provide further evidence that there are
signiﬁcant long-run frictions in the economy.
Finally, while a worker's earnings represent an important market outcome, it is important
to remember that wages make up only a part of the total compensation to the worker. The
true quality of a job match has many dimensions, such as beneﬁts, working conditions,
and countless other compensating diﬀerentials. The interaction of monopsony with these
non-wage goods should be explored in future research.
3 Theoretical Model
A central feature of perfect competition is the law of one wage, that all workers of equal
ability should be paid the same market clearing wage. In an attempt to explain how wage
dispersion can indeed be an equilibrium outcome, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) develop a
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model of the economy in which employers post wages based on the wage-posting behavior
of competing employers. Even assuming equal ability for all workers, wage dispersion is an
equilibrium outcome as long as one assumes that the arrival rate of job oﬀers is positive
but ﬁnite (perfect competition characterizes the limiting case, as the arrival rate tends to
inﬁnity). While I do not explicity estimate the Burdett and Mortensen model in this paper,
the intuition of monopsony power derived from search frictions is central to this study. See
Kuhn (2004) for a critique of the use of equilibrium search models in a monopsony context.
The Burdett and Mortensen model of equilibrium wage dispersion
Assume there are Mt equally productive workers (where productivity is given by p), each
gaining utility b from leisure. Further assume there are Me constant returns to scale ﬁrms
which are inﬁnitesimally small when compared to the entire economy. A ﬁrm sets wage w
to maximize steady-state proﬁts pi = (p-w)N(w) where N(w) represents the supply of labor
to the ﬁrm. Also deﬁne F(w) as the cdf of wage oﬀers observed in the economy, and f(w) is
the corresponding pdf. All workers within a ﬁrm must be paid the same wage. Employed
workers will accept a wage oﬀer w' if it is greater than their current wage w, and non-
employed workers will accept w' if w'=b where b is their reservation wage. Wage oﬀers are
drawn randomly from the distribution F(w), and arrive to all workers at rate λ. Assume
an exogenous job destruction rate δ, and that all workers leave the job market at rate δ
to be replaced in nonemployment by an equivalent number of workers. RN denotes The
recruitment ﬂow and separation rate functions are given by:
R(w) = RN + λ
∫ w
0
f(x)N(x)dx (1)
s(w) = δ + λ(1− F (w)) (2)
Burdett and Mortensen (1998), or alternatively Manning (2003), show that in this econ-
omy, as long as λ is positive and ﬁnite, there will be a nondegenerate distribution of wages
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even when all workers are equally productive. As λ tends to zero, the wage distribution will
collapse to the monopsony wage, which in this particular economy would be the reservation
wage b. As λ tends to inﬁnity the wage distribution will collapse to the perfectly competitive
wage, the marginal product of labor p.
Note that the following primarily relies on the model presented in Manning (2003), and
incorporates a key insight from the recent working paper by Depew and Sorensen (2011) to
derive the least restrictive formula for the labor supply elasticity facing the ﬁrm currently in
the literature. We can recursively formulate the supply of labor to a ﬁrm with the following
equation, where R(w) is the ﬂow of recruits to a ﬁrm and s(w) is the separation rate.
Nt(w) = Nt−1(w)[1− st−1(w)] +Rt−1(w) (3)
Equation (3) formalizes the deﬁnitionally true statement that a ﬁrm's employment this
period is equal to the fraction of workers from last period who stay with the ﬁrm plus the
number of new recruits. Noting that Nt = γNt−1 where γ is the rate of employment growth
between period t-1 and t, we can rewrite Equation (3) as
Nt(w) =
Rt(w)
1− (1− st(w)) 1γt
(4)
Taking the natural log of each side, multiplying by w, and diﬀerentiating we can write the
elasticity of labor supply, ε, at time t as a function of the long-run elasticities of recruitment
and separations, as well as the contemporary separation and growth rates.
εt = εR − εS st(w)
γt + st(w)− 1 (5)
We can further decompose the recruitment and separation elasticities in the following
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way
εt = θ
RεER + (1− θR)εNR − θSεES
sEt (w)
γt + sEt (w)− 1
− (1− θS)εNS
sNt (w)
γt + sNt (w)− 1
(6)
Where the elasticity of recruitment has been broken down into the elasticity of recruit-
ment of workers from employment (εER) and the elasticity of recruitment of workers from
nonemployment (εNR ). Similarly the elasticity of separation has been decomposed into the
elasticity of separation to employment (εES ) and the elasticity of separation to nonemploy-
ment (εNS ). θ
Rand θS represent the share of recruits from employment and the share of
separations to employment respectively.
While there are established methods for estimating separation elasticities with standard
job-ﬂow data, recruitment elasticities are not identiﬁed without detailed information about
every job oﬀer a worker receives. Therefore, it would be helpful to express the elasticities of
recruitment from employment and noemployment as functions of estimable quantities.
Looking ﬁrst at the elasticity of recruitment from employment, we can write the recruit-
ment from employment function and its derivative as
RE(w) = λ
∫ w
0
f(x)N(x)dx (7)
∂RE(w)
∂w
= λf(w)N(w) (8)
Combining Equations (4), (7), and (8), along with the deﬁnition of an elasticity (εER =
w
RE(w)
∂RE(w)
∂w
), we get:
εER =
wλf(w)
1 +
sEt (w)
γt
− 1
γt
(9)
In dealing with the numerator, note that the the derivative of the separation to employ-
ment function, sE(w) = λ(1− F (w)), is
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∂sE(w)
∂w
= −λf(w) (10)
Combining equations (9), (10), and the deﬁnition of an elasticity (εEs =
w
sE(w)
∂sE(w)
∂w
), we
can write the elasticity of recruitment from employment as a function of estimable quantities:
εER =
−εES sEt (w)
1 +
sEt (w)
γt
− 1
γt
(11)
Next, Manning (2003, p. 100) notes that the elasticity of recruitment from nonemploy-
ment can be written as
εNR = ε
E
R − wθ‘R(w)/θR(w)(1− θR(w)) (12)
This is derived from the simple deﬁnition of θR, the share of total recruits which come
from employment, which implies RN = RE(1 − θR)/θR, where RN and RE are the recruits
from nonemployment and employment respectively. Taking the natural log of each side of this
relation and diﬀerentiating yields the relation depicted in Equation (12). The second term
on the right-hand side of Equation (12) can be thought of as the bargaining premium that an
employee receives from searching while currently employed. Thus, the labor supply elasticity
to the ﬁrm can be written as a function of both separation elasticities, the premium to
searching while employed, and the calculated separation and growth rates. To my knowledge,
no other study has estimated this model before.
In an economy where the arrival rate of job oﬀers is ﬁnite (and thus the labor supply
elasticity is ﬁnite) ﬁrms are not bound by market forces to pay workers their marginal
product of labor. The model presented above implies that, even in a world where all ﬁrms
and individuals are identical, a decrease in the arrival rate of job oﬀers will both lower the
average wage and increase inequality. To see how a ﬁrm's labor supply elasticity aﬀects the
wage it pays, consider a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm which faces the following objective function:
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Max
w
Π = pQ(L)− wL(w) (13)
P is the price of the output produced according to the production function Q. The
choice of wage w determines the labor supplied to the ﬁrm L. Taking ﬁrst order conditions,
substituting ε = w
L(w)
∂L(w)
∂w
, and solving for w yields:
w =
pQ′(L)
1 + 1
ε
(14)
The numerator in Equation (14) is simply the marginal product of labor, and ε is the labor
supply elasticity faced by the ﬁrm. It is easy to see that in the case of perfect competition
(ε = ∞) that the wage is equal to the marginal product of labor, but the wage is less than
then marginal product for all 0 < ε <∞.
Every empirical study in the new monopsony literature attempts to estimate the labor
supply elasticity to the ﬁrm at the market level. In other words, they measure the (ﬁrm-size
weighted) average slope of each ﬁrm's supply curve in the market. In a highly competitive
market we would expect these elasticities to be very large numbers. Among the contributions
of this paper is to separately estimate each ﬁrm's labor supply elasticity rather than a market
average.
4 Data and Methodology
Data
The Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) data are built primarily from Un-
employment Insurance (UI) wage records, which cover approximately 98 percent of wage and
salary payments in private sector non-farm jobs. Information about the ﬁrms is constructed
from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). The LEHD infrastructure
allows users to follow both workers and ﬁrms over time, as well as to identify workers who
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share a common employer. Firms in these data are deﬁned at the state level, which means
that a Walmart in Florida and a Walmart in Georgia would be considered to be diﬀerent
ﬁrms. However, all Walmarts in Florida are considered to be part of the same ﬁrm. These
data also include demographic characteristics of the worker and basic ﬁrm characteristics,
obtained through administrative record and statistical links. For a complete description of
these data, see Abowd et al. (2009).
My sample consists of quarterly observations on earnings and employment for 47 states
between 1985 and 20083. I make several sample restrictions in an attempt to obtain the most
economically meaningful results. These restrictions are necessary in large part because the
earnings data are derived from tax records, and thus any payment made to an individual,
no matter how small, will appear in the sample. As a consequence, there are many job
spells which appear to last only one quarter, but are in fact one-time payments which do
not conform with the general view of a job match between a ﬁrm and worker.
Figure 1: Proportion of Employment Covered by the LEHD Infrastructure
Reproduced with permission from Abowd and Vilhuber (2011)
3The states not in the sample are Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Not all states are
in the LEHD infrastructure for the entire time-frame, but once a state enters it is in the sample for all
subsequent periods. Figure 1.1 presents the coverage level of the US economy reproduced from Abowd and
Vilhuber (2011).
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First, I only include an employment spell in the sample if at some point it could be
considered the dominant job, deﬁned as paying the highest wage of an individual's jobs in a
given quarter4. I also remove all spells which span fewer than three quarters.5 This sample
restriction is related to the construction of the earnings variable. Since the data do not
contain information on when in the quarter an individual was hired/separated, the entries
for the ﬁrst and last quarters of any employment spell will almost certainly underestimate the
quarterly earnings rate (unless the individual was hired on the ﬁrst day or left employment
on the last day of a quarter). Thus, in order to get an accurate measurement of the earnings
rate I must observe an individual in at least one quarter other than the ﬁrst or last of an
employment spell. I remove job spells which have average earnings greater than $1 million
per quarter and less than $100 per quarter, which corresponds approximately to the top and
bottom 1 percent of observations
Additionally, I limit the analysis to ﬁrms with 100 total employment spells of any length
over the lifespan of the ﬁrm. For the full-economy monopsony model, these sample re-
strictions yield a ﬁnal sample of approximately 149,710,000 unique individuals who had
325,630,000 total employment spells at 670,000 diﬀerent ﬁrms. Additionally, for analyses
using the ﬁrm-level measure of the labor supply elasticity, only ﬁrms which have greater
than 25 separations to employment, 25 separations to unemployment, and 25 recruits from
employment over the lifespan of the ﬁrm are considered. This reduces the analysis sample
to approximately 121,190,000 unique individuals having 267,310,000 employment spells at
340,000 unique ﬁrms.
4This formulation allows an individual to have more than one dominant job in a given quarter. The
rationale behind this deﬁnition is that I wish to include all job spells where the wage is important to the
worker. The vast majority of job spells in my sample, 89.9 percent, have 0 or 1 quarters of overlap with
other job spells. Restricting the dominant job deﬁnition to only allow one dominant job at a given time does
not alter the reported results.
5The relaxation of this assumption does not appreciably alter any of the reported results.
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Empirical Strategy
The primary reason for the small empirical literature on monopsony is a lack of high quality
data. In order to identify a ﬁrm's market power, the researcher must have a credible ﬁrm-
level instrument for each ﬁrm studied or detailed employer-employee linked data to identify
worker ﬂows. I employ the latter approach in this study since ﬁnding a credible instrument for
nearly every ﬁrm in the US is unlikely. The construction of the market power measures most
closely represents an augmented ﬁrm-level implementation of the methodology proposed in
Manning (2003).
I ﬁrst describe in detail how the market power measures are calculated, followed by a
description of how they are used to examine the US earnings distribution.
Location-Based Measures
I construct an overall measure of the percent of the industry-speciﬁc labor market that each
ﬁrm employs (Number of workers at ﬁrm i/number of workers in ﬁrm i's county and in
ﬁrm i's industry) using North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) industry
deﬁnitions. While this variable is far from a perfect measure of an employer's power to
set wages, it has several advantages over the dynamic measures to be used later in the
paper. Both the construction of these measures and the regression estimates using them are
transparent. Endogeneity, misspeciﬁed equations, etc. are of less concern in the construction
of these labor concentration measures, and the interpretation of the regression coeﬃcients on
these variables is straightforward. This analysis corresponds to the traditional concentration
ratio approach of analyzing labor market power.
Dynamic Measure
The simplest way to estimate the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm would be to regress the
natural log of ﬁrm size on the natural log of ﬁrm wages. However, even when controlling for
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various demographic characteristics, this is deemed to produce a potentially biased estimate6.
I therefore rely on estimating parameters presented in the theoretical section which are
plausibly identiﬁed, and then combine them using results from Manning (2003) and equation
(6) to produce an estimate of the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm.
To my knowledge, only Hirsch et al. (2010) has used a similar, but considerably more
restrictive, method with administrative data which yielded an economy-wide estimate of the
average labor supply curve facing the ﬁrm. Manning (2003) also estimates an economy-wide
measure of the degree of monopsony using surveys such as the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY) 1979. One of the major contributions of this paper is that I estimate
the labor supply elasticities for each ﬁrm, rather than the average over the whole economy.
Additionally, these prior studies imposed a steady-state assumption on their model, which
the model in this paper does not impose. Estimating the labor supply elasticities at the ﬁrm
level does have several advantages. First, the estimation of each of the elasticity components
is much more ﬂexible than even the least constrained speciﬁcations of Hirsch et al. (2010).
Second, I will be able to use the measures as an explanatory variable, and can test a number
of diﬀerent models. Finally, I will be able to examine the eﬀect of market power on earnings
at each point in the market power distribution, rather than examining only the average eﬀect.
This is particularly important because theory predicts signiﬁcant nonlinear eﬀects relating to
the labor supply elasticity and a ﬁrm's ability to mark down wages (Pigou, 1924). However,
this strategy has the drawback that I am unable to estimate the relevant parameters, and
thus the labor supply elasticity, for the smallest ﬁrms (sample restrictions are discussed in
the data section).
According to the results presented in the theoretical model section, three quantities
must be estimated in order to construct the labor supply elasticity measure, (εES , ε
N
S and
wθR
′
(w)/θR(w)(1− θR(w))), as well as the calculated separation and growth rates for each
6The ﬁrm size-wage premium is a well known result in the labor economics literature, and is often
attributed to non-monopsony related factors such as economies of scale increasing the productivity, and thus
the marginal product, of workers at large ﬁrms
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ﬁrm. Each of the following models will be run separately for every ﬁrm in the sample (as
well as on the whole sample for comparison purposes), where the unit of observation is an
employment spell, thus one individual can appear in multiple ﬁrm's models. Looking ﬁrst
at the separation elasticities, I model separations to nonemployment as a Cox proportional
hazard model given by
λN(t|βN,seplog(earnings)i +XiγN,sep) = λ0(t) exp(βN,seplog(earnings)i +XiγN,sep) (15)
where λ() is the hazard function, λ0 is the baseline hazard, t is the length of employment,
log(earnings) is the natural log of individual i's average quarterly earnings,7 and X is a vector
of explanatory variables including gender, race, age, education, and year control variables
(industry controls are also included in the full-economy model). While the entire sample will
be used, workers who transition to a new employer or who are with the same employer at
the end of the data series are considered to have a censored employment spell. In this model,
the parameter β represents an estimate of the separation elasticity to nonemployment. In
an analogous setting, I model separations to employment as
λE(t|βE,seplog(earnings)
i
+Xiγ
E,sep) = λ0(t) exp(β
E,seplog(earnings)i +Xiγ
E,sep) (16)
with the only diﬀerence being that the sample is restricted to those workers who do not
have a job transition to nonemployment. As before, β represents an estimate of the sep-
aration elasticity to employment. To estimate the third quantity needed for equation (6),
wθ‘R(w)/θR(w)(1− θR(w)), Manning (2003) shows that this is equivalent to the coeﬃcient
on log earnings when estimating the following logistic regression
7As mentioned above, this measure excludes the ﬁrst and last quarters of a job spell. Alternative measures
of earnings have also been used, such as the last observed (full) quarter of earnings, with no substantial
diﬀerence in the estimated elasticities.
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Prec =
exp(βE,reclog(earnings)i +Xiγ
E,rec)
1 + exp(βE,reclog(earnings)i +XiγE,rec)
(17)
where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if a worker was recruited from employment
and 0 if they were recruited from nonemployment. To enable this coeﬃcient to vary over
time, log earnings is interacted with time dummies. The same explanatory variables used
in the separation equations are used in this logistic regression. At this point the results
listed in the theoretical section can be used (along with calculating the share of recruits and
separations to employment, separation rates, and growth rates for each ﬁrm) in conjunction
with equation (6) to produce an estimate of the labor supply elasticity facing each ﬁrm. 8
To provide some intuition on the models being estimated, consider the analysis of sepa-
rations to employment. A large (in absolute value) coeﬃcient on the log earnings variable
implies that a small decrease in an individual's earnings will greatly increase the probability
of separating in any given period. In a perfectly competitive economy, we would expect
this coeﬃcient to be inﬁnitely high. Similarly, a very small coeﬃcient implies that the em-
ployer can lower the wage rate without seeing a substantial decline in employment. One
concern with this procedure is that this measure of monopsony power is actually proxying
for high-wage ﬁrms, reﬂecting an eﬃciency wage view of the economy where ﬁrms pay a
wage considerably above the market wage in exchange for lower turnover. This is much
more of a concern in the full economy estimate of the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm
found elsewhere in the literature than in my ﬁrm-level estimation since the models in this
paper are run separately by ﬁrm. The logic behind this diﬀerence is that in the full economy
model cross-sectional variation in the level of earnings is used to identify the labor supply
elasticity. In a ﬁrm-speciﬁc model, however, the labor supply elasticity of ﬁrm A does not
mechanically depend on the level of earnings at ﬁrm B. This eﬃciency wage hypothesis will
8Each equation was also estimated with an indicator variable for whether the employment spell was in
progress at the beginning of the data window to correct for potential bias of truncated records. Additionally,
all models were reestimated using only job spells for which the entire job spell was observed, with no
substantial diﬀerences observed betweeen these models.
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be directly tested.
Analysis
In addition to the full-economy models of monopsony, I include the concentration ratio
and ﬁrm-level labor supply elasticity measures in earnings regressions. This provides direct
evidence of the eﬀect of ﬁrm market power on earnings, a feature not possible in the full-
economy models. Additionally, it serves as a test of the eﬃciency wage hypothesis, which
predicts that ﬁrms with low estimated labor supply elasticities will pay the highest wages.
The main focus of this paper is on this model, explicitly written as:
log(quarterly earningsij) = βmarketpowerj + γXij + δYj + θZi + εij (18)
The dependent variable is the natural log of individual i's quarterly earnings in employ-
ment spell j. The market power variable represents ﬁrm j's estimated labor supply elasticity
or the share of the local working population employed at the ﬁrm. X is a vector of person and
ﬁrm characteristics, which may vary by the employment spell, including age, age-squared,
tenure (quarters employed at ﬁrm), tenure-squared, education9, gender, race, ethnicity, year
eﬀects, indicator variables for the two-digit NAICS sector, and the size (employment) of the
ﬁrm. Y is a vector of ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, Z is a vector of person ﬁxed-eﬀects, and ε is the
error term. Time-invariant characteristics in X are excluded in models with person or ﬁrm
ﬁxed-eﬀects.
Finally, to examine whether there is a disproportionate impact of imperfect competition
on workers near the bottom of the earnings distribution, I construct a counterfactual earnings
distributions in which each ﬁrm's labor supply elasticity is increased. The counterfactual
9Reported educational attainment is only available for about 15 percent of the sample, although sophis-
ticated imputations of education are available for the entire sample. The results presented in this paper
correspond the the full sample of workers (reported education and imputed education). All models were also
run on the sample with no imputed data, and no substantive diﬀerences were observed. In particular, since
the preferred speciﬁcation includes person ﬁxed-eﬀects, and thus educational attainment drops out of the
model, this is of little concern.
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distribution is constructed according to the unconditional quantile approach decomposition
suggested in Firpo et al. (2011). Unconditional quantile regression, ﬁrst introduced in Firpo
et al. (2009), estimates the parameters of a regression model as they relate to the quantiles of
the dependent variable. This contrasts with traditional quantile regression, which estimates
parameters corresponding to the conditional (on the included regressors) quantiles of the
dependent variable. The unconditional quantile approach is most advantageous in models
with relatively low R-squared (i.e. all wage regressions) since the quantiles of y are most
likely to diverge from the quantiles of y-hat (predicted dependent variable) in this scenario.
Under this approach, unconditional quantile regressions are performed on every 5th quan-
tile of the earnings distribution using the same model as Equation (18). The estimated
coeﬃcients on the labor supply elasticity variable from each regression will then be used
to simulate the impact of a one unit increase in the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm on
earnings in the associated quantile.
5 Results
Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 reports both employment spell and ﬁrm-level summary statistics. Since the unit
of observation is the employment spell rather than the individual, and only dominant jobs
are included, some statistics deviate slightly from typical observational studies of the labor
market (such as a nearly even split of job spells between men and women). The average
employment spell lasts about two and a half years, with more than sixty percent of spells
resulting from a move from another job. The quarterly nature of the LEHD data make it
diﬃcult to precisely identify10 whether an individual separated to employment or nonem-
10The deﬁnition used in this paper requires an individual to have no reported earnings for an entire quarter
following an employment spell to be deﬁned as a separation to nonemployment, with all other separations
coded as a separation to employment. This deﬁnition was chosen because it lead to the most conservative
(least monopsonistic) results, although the diﬀerences were small. The other methods tried involved imputing
the time during the quarter at which employment stopped/started based on a comparison of the earnings
reported in the last/ﬁrst quarter to a quarter in which I know the individual worked the entire quarter.
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ployment, and therefore the proportion of separations to employment is slightly higher than
comparable statistics reported in Manning (2003).
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev
Unit of Observation: Employment Spell
Age 38 15.2
Female 0.5 0.5
White 0.77 0.42
Hispanic 0.14 0.34
< High School 0.14 0.34
High School Diploma 0.29 0.45
Some College 0.32 0.47
College Degree+ 0.25 0.43
Tenure (Quarters) 10.1 10.7
Log(Quarterly Earnings) 8.5 1
Firm Concentration 0.01 0.02
Separation Rate 0.15 0.13
Recruited from Employment 0.64 0.48
Observations 267,310,000
Unit of Observation: Firm
Firm Industry-Concentration 0.09 0.16
Firm Hires per Quarter 493 1592
Firm Employment 2962 10772
Employment Growth Rate 1.01 0.15
Observations 340,000
The average ﬁrm in my sample employs nearly 3000 workers and hires almost 500 in a
given quarter. Several qualiﬁcations must be made for these statistics. First, the distribu-
tions are highly skewed, with the median ﬁrm employing only 400 and hiring 75 in a given
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quarter. Second is that statistics are not point in time estimates, but rather totals through-
out an entire quarter. Finally, remember that these are at the ﬁrm (state-level) rather than
at the establishement (individual unit) level. Also of note are the employment concentration
ratios, with the average ﬁrm employing roughly 9 percent of their county's industry speciﬁc
labor force.
Location-Based Measure
As previously noted, many studies have attempted to search for evidence of monopsony in
the labor market through the use of concentration ratios. While this approach was the best
available given prior data constraints, it assumes that monopsony power is derived only from
geographical constraints.
Table 1.2 presents the estimated impact of a ten percentage point increase in the con-
centration ratio in various speciﬁcations of Equation (18). These results suggest that, in
general, a ﬁrm's geographic dominance does not appear to signiﬁcantly alter the wage bill
it pays. Note that when the models are run separately by North American Industry Classi-
ﬁcation System (NAICS) sector, as depicted in Table 1.3, there is evidence that ﬁrms with
high concentration ratios in certain industries (such as the utilities sector) pay slightly lower
wage bills. However, the eﬀect sizes are small relative to the observed distribution of concen-
tration ratios. Given the small results, and the fact that the industry-speciﬁc eﬀects seem
to be centered around zero, it seems plausible to conclude that geographic constraints in the
labor market play at most a small role in wage determination for the average worker.
24
Table 1.2: Impact of Firm Concentration on Earnings
Impact of a ten
percentage point increase
in concentration ratio on
log(earnings)
0.0213 0.0053 0.0109 0.0066 0.0114
Demographic and human
capital controls
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employer controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Tenure Controls No No No Yes Yes
State ﬁxed-eﬀects No No No No Yes
R-Squared 0.0013 0.2369 0.3300 0.3438 0.3502
Observations 325,630,000 325,630,000 325,630,000 325,630,000 325,630,000
*A pooled national sample of all dominant employment spells is used in this set of
regressions. The dependent variable is the natural log of quarterly earnings. Demographic
and human capital controls include: age, age-squared, and indicator variables for gender,
ethnicity, racial status, and education level. Employer controls include indicator variables
for each of the 20 NAICS sectors and number of employees working at the ﬁrm. Tenure
controls include the length (in quarters) of the employment spell, as well as its squared
term. Year eﬀects are included in all models. Standard errors are not reported because all
t-statistics are greater than 50. Observation counts are rounded to the nearest 10,000 for
conﬁdentiallity reasons.
Full-Economy Model
I ﬁrst compute the average labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm prevailing in the economy
by estimating Equations (15)-(17) on a pooled sample of all (dominant) employment spells,
and combining the results according to Equation (6). Table 1.4 presents the output of
a several speciﬁcations of the full-economy monopsony model. The estimated elasticities
range from 0.76 to 0.82 depending on the speciﬁcation.11 These elasticities are certainly on
the small side, implying that at the average ﬁrm a wage cut of one percent would only reduce
employment by .8 percent. However, this magnitude is still within the range observed by
Manning (2003) in the NLSY79. Additionally, even the inclusion of ﬁxed-eﬀects still puts
many more restrictions on the parameter estimates than separate estimations for each ﬁrm.
Based on a comparison of the full-economy model and the ﬁrm-level model presented in the
11i.e. The inclusion of random eﬀects and the use of a conditional logit model to account for person or
ﬁrm eﬀects as in Hirsch et al. (2010)
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next section, the failure to fully saturate the full economy model likely produces downward
biased estimates. A detailed discussion of factors which may attenuate these estimates,
as well as structural reasons we should expect these results from US data, is given in the
Discussion and Extensions section.
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Table 1.3: Concentration Ratio Regressions by NAICS Sector
Industry Impact of a ten percentage point
increase in concentration ratio on log
earnings
Agriculture 0.0055
Mining/Oil/Natural Gas 0.0071
Utilities -0.0760
Construction -0.0157
Manufacturing 0.0050
Wholesale Trade -0.0142
Resale Trade -0.0009
Transportation 0.0361
Information -0.0308
Finance and Insurance -0.015
Real Estate and Rental 0.022
Profession/Scientiﬁc/Technical
Services
0.019
Management of Companies 0.056
Administrative Support -0.01
Educational Services -0.005
Health Care and Social Assistance 0.016
Arts and Entertainment 0.046
Accommodation and Food Services 0.021
Other Services -0.129
Public Administration -0.013
*A pooled national sample of all dominant employment spells is used in this
set of regressions. The dependent variable is the natural log of quarterly
earnings. Demographic and human capital controls include: age, age-squared,
and indicator variables for gender, ethnicity, racial status, and education
level. Employer controls include the number of employees working at the
ﬁrm. Tenure controls include the length (in quarters) of the employment
spell, as well as its squared term. Year eﬀects are included in all models.
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Table 1.4: Full-Economy Estimate of the Labor Supply Elasticity to the Firm
Full sample Full sample with
ﬁrm FE
Only ﬁrms with an
individually
estimated elasticity
.76 .82 .81
*These labor supply elasticities were obtained by estimating equations
(15)-(17), on a pooled sample of all (dominant) employment spells. Each
model contained age, age-squared, along with indicator variables for female,
nonwhite, Hispanic, high school diploma, some college, college degree or
greater, year, and each of 20 NAICS sectors.
Firm-Level Measure
Table 1.5 presents the elasticities estimated through Equations (15)-(17). The ﬁrst four
columns report the average ﬁrm-level elasticities of recruitment from employment and nonem-
ployment, and the separation elasticities to employment and nonemployment respectively.
The ﬁnal column combines these elasticities, along with the calculated shares of separa-
tions/recruits to/from employment to obtain the labor supply elasticity. Of note is that the
labor supply elasticity does not appear to depend substantially on the regressors included
in the model. The ﬁrst three rows report only the long-run elasticities, while the ﬁnal row
describes the elasticities when each quantitiy is allowed to vary over time. Not accounting
for the time-varying nature of the labor supply elasticity, as has been common in the prior
literature, appears to underestimate its magnitude by 20%.
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Table 1.5: Firm-Level Labor Supply Elasticities
Model εER ε
N
R ε
E
S ε
N
S ε
Earnings Only 0.41 0.1 -0.41 -0.5 0.84
No Education Controls 0.43 0.3 -0.43 -0.52 0.89
Full Model 0.47 0.46 -0.47 -0.54 0.95
Full Model
(Time-Varying)
0.6 0.59 -0.6 -0.67 1.08
The ﬁrst row represents estimates from equations (15)-(17) where the only regressor in
each model is log earnings. The second row estimates the same equations, and includes
age, age-squared, along with indicator variables for female, nonwhite, Hispanic, and year
eﬀects. Employer controls include number of employees working at the ﬁrm and industry
indicator variables. The third row adds indicator variables for completing a high school
diploma, some college, and college degree or greater. The ﬁrst four columns report the
average ﬁrm-level elasticities of recruitment from employment and nonemployment, and
the separation elasticities to employment and nonemployment respectively. The ﬁnal
column combines these elasticities, along with the calculated shares of
separations/recruits to/from employment, separation rates, and growth rates to obtain
the labor supply elasticity. The ﬁrst three rows report only the long-run elasticities, while
the fourth row describes the elasticities when a steady-state is not assumed, and they are
allowed to vary over time.
Table 1.6 displays information about the distribution of ﬁrms' labor supply elasticities,
and Figure 1.2 presents a kernel density plot of the market power measure12. This distri-
bution is constructed by separately estimating Equations (15)-(17) for each ﬁrm. While
the median supply elasticity (0.75) is close to the estimate from the full-economy model,
there appears to be signiﬁcant variation in the market power possessed by ﬁrms. I estimate
a mean labor supply elasticity of 1.08, however, there are many ﬁrms (about 3 percent of
the sample) with labor supply elasticities greater than 5. It appears that while there is a
nontrivial fraction of ﬁrms whose behavior approximates a highly competitive labor market,
the majority of the distribution is characterized by signiﬁcant frictions.While not surprising,
to my knowledge this is the ﬁrst documentation of the large discrepancy in ﬁrms' ability to
set the wage.
12For conﬁdentiality reasons, the long right tail of the kernel density plot has been suppressed
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Table 1.6: Distribution of Estimated Firm-Level Labor Supply Elasticities
Percentiles
Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
1.08 0.22 0.44 0.75 1.13 1.73
*Three separate regressions, corresponding to equations (15)-(17), were
estimated separately for each ﬁrm in the data which met the conditions
described in the data section. The coeﬃcients on log earnings in each
regression were combined, weighted by the share of recruits and separations
to employment, separation rates, and growth rates according to equation (6)
to obtain the estimate of the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm.
Demographic and human capital controls include: age, age-squared, and
indicator variables for gender, ethnicity, racial status, and education level.
Employer controls include number of employees working at the ﬁrm and
industry indicator variables. Year eﬀects are included in all models.
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Labor Supply Elasticities
Table 1.7 reports average labor supply elasticities broken down by NAICS sector. I
ﬁnd signiﬁcant variation in these estimates across industries. The manufacturing sector
appears to enjoy the least wage-setting power, with a labor supply elasticity of 1.82. As
manufacturing is likely the most heavily unionized of all sectors, this result is not surprising.
By contrast, ﬁrms in the health care (0.78) and administrative support (0.72) sectors seem
to wield the greatest wage-setting power. This is consistent with the focus on the healthcare
market among economists investigating monopsony power.
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Table 1.7: Mean Labor Supply Elasticity by NAICS Sector
NAICS Sector Mean Labor Supply Elasticity
Agriculture 1.43
Mining/Oil/Natural Gas 1.52
Utilities 1.18
Construction 1.42
Manufacturing 1.82
Wholesale Trade 1.48
Resale Trade 1.03
Transportation 1.47
Information 1.17
Finance and Insurance 1.27
Real Estate and Rental 1.01
Profession/Scientiﬁc/Technical
Services
1.17
Management of Companies 1.17
Administrative Support 0.72
Educational Services 0.91
Health Care and Social Assistance 0.78
Arts and Entertainment 0.94
Accommodation and Food Services 0.85
Other Services 1.04
Public Administration 1.19
*The numbers in this table represent averages by NAICS sector of the
estimated labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm. Three separate regressions,
corresponding to equations (15)-(17), were estimated separately for each ﬁrm
in the data which met the conditions described in the data section. The
coeﬃcients on log earnings in each regression were combined, weighted by the
share of recruits and separations to employment, separation rates, and
growth rates according to equation (6) to obtain the estimate of the labor
supply elasticity to the ﬁrm. Demographic and human capital controls
include: age, age-squared, and indicator variables for gender, ethnicity, racial
status, and education level. Employer controls include number of employees
working at the ﬁrm. Year eﬀects are included in all models.
The central focus of this paper is presented in Table 1.8, which estimates various speci-
ﬁcations of Equation (18) in order to measure the impact of market power on the earnings
distribution. Unconditionally, a one unit increase in the labor supply elasticity increases
earnings by .13 log points. Even the speciﬁcations with the most detailed controls estimate
a strong positive relationship between a ﬁrm's labor supply elasticity and the earnings of its
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workers. These estimates range from an impact of 0.05 log points in the model with person
ﬁxed-eﬀects to an impact of 0.9 log points (or 10 percent after applying the forumula exp(β))
with a full compliment of ﬁrm eﬀects13. This is an important result for the new monopsony
literature, because it rules out the possibility that the dynamic model identiﬁcation strategy
is actually identifying high-wage ﬁrms whose employees do not often switch jobs due to the
high wages.
There is good reason to believe that the estimates in Table 1.8 are lower bounds of the
true impact of ﬁrm market power on earnings. Each labor supply elasticity is a weighted
average of many more precisely deﬁned elasticities which would more accurately measure
a ﬁrm's market power over a particular individual. For example, ﬁrms likely face diﬀerent
supply elasticities for every occupation, and potentially diﬀerent elasticities across race and
gender groups. From a measurement error perspective, regressing the log of earnings on the
average labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm would attenuate the estimates relative to the ideal
scenario where I could separately identify every occupation speciﬁc elasticity.
13All models were also run using the time-invariant long run labor supply elasticity rather than the time
varying measure. The results of each model which could be run using this measure (ﬁrm eﬀects could not
be included) were nearly identical.
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Table 1.8: Impact of Firm Market Power on Earnings
Coeﬃcient on
labor supply
elasticity
0.13 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09
Demographic
controls
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employer controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State ﬁxed-eﬀects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Person
ﬁxed-eﬀects
No No No No No Yes No
Firm
ﬁxed-eﬀects
No No No No No No Yes
R-Squared 0.005 0.238 0.312 0.331 0.338 0.784 0.90
*A pooled national sample of all dominant employment spells subject to the
sample restriction described in the data section is used in this set of regressions.
The dependent variable is the natural log of quarterly earnings. Demographic
controls include: age, age-squared, and indicator variables for gender, ethnicity,
racial status, and education level. Employer controls include the number of
employees working at the ﬁrm and industry indicator variables. Tenure controls
include the length (in quarters) of the employment spell, as well as its squared
term. Year eﬀects are included in all models. These results are unweighted,
however all models were also estimated with demographic weights constructed by
the author. There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the weighted and
unweighted models. Standard errors are not reported because the t-statistics
range from 500-1000, but are available upon request along with all other estimated
coeﬃcients. There are 267,310,000 observations in each speciﬁcation.
While these results are clear evidence that ﬁrms exercise their market power, there is
reason to believe that ﬁrms are not using the majority of labor market power available to
them. Bronfenbrenner (1956) ﬁrst made this point, arguing that most ﬁrms in our economy
likely faced upward sloping labor supply curves but that these ﬁrms would not pay substan-
tially less than the competitive wage. This could be because ﬁrm's choose to maximize some
function of proﬁts and other quantities such as public perception and worker happiness.
To test this assertion, we can calculate what the coeﬃcient on labor supply elasticity
should be in an economy where ﬁrms only maximize proﬁts and the mean labor supply
elasticity is 1.08. This is done by taking the derivative of the coeﬃcient on the marginal
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product of labor in Equation (14) and dividing this by the coeﬃcient itself, a formula which
simpliﬁes to 1
ε2+ε
. Evaluating this at a labor supply elasticity of 1.08 implies that if ﬁrms
were exploiting all of their market power then the markdown from the marginal product
of labor implied by the coeﬃcient on labor supply elasticity in Table 1.8 should be about
0.45, much greater than the estimated eﬀect. Even assuming a high degree of measurement
error in the assignment of the average labor supply elasticity to all workers in a ﬁrm would
likely not account for this disparity. One possibility is that ﬁrms reduce labor costs through
other avenues than wages which are more easily manipulated such as beneﬁts. Alternatively,
this may be evidence that ﬁrms do not solely maximize proﬁts, but instead maximize some
combination of proﬁts and other quantities (i.e. public perception).
Also of note in Table 1.8 is how the coeﬃcient on the gender-speciﬁc labor supply elasticity
variable changes as person and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects are added. The noticable increase in the
coeﬃcient, both when ﬁrm and person eﬀects are added to the model, imply that on average
low-wage ﬁrms have higher labor supply elasticities, and low-wage workers have higher labor
supply elasticities. This is in line with the current thinking regarding monopsony power and
its interaction with skilled and unskilled labor (Stevens, 1994; Muehlemann et al., 2010).
Counterfactual Distribution
Table 1.9 details the disproportionate eﬀect which ﬁrms' market power has on workers at
the low end of the earnings distribution. Assuming a one unit increase in the labor supply
elasticity for each ﬁrm (approximately 1 standard deviation), the 10th percentile of the earn-
ings distribution increases by 0.09 log points under the counterfactual assumption, while the
median worker sees an increase of 0.04 log points and the 90th percentile remains unchanged.
The nonlinear impacts are also clearly seen in the unconditional quantile regression coeﬃ-
cients, which are 4-5 times greater than the OLS coeﬃcient at lower quantiles and essentially
zero at the upper end of the distribution.
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Table 1.9: Counterfactual Distribution Analysis
Change (log points) in Quantiles of the Earnings Distribution
Quantile 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Change in
log(earnings)
0.09 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00
Inequality
measure
Variance 90-10 50-10 90-50
Earnings
distribution
.94 1.32 1.18 1.12
Counterfactual
distribution
.86 1.30 1.16 1.11
*The counterfactual distribution was constructed by estimating unconditional quantile
regressions at every ﬁfth quantile of the earnings distribution, and using the supply
elasticity coeﬃcient from each regression to simulate the eﬀect at each quantile of a
one-unit increase of the labor supply elasticity. Demographic and human capital controls
include: age, age-squared, and indicator variables for gender, ethnicity, racial status, and
education level. Employer controls include the number of employees working at the ﬁrm
and industry indicator variables. Tenure controls include the length (in quarters) of the
employment spell, as well as its squared term. Year eﬀects are included in all models.
Standard measures of inequality are also reported in Table 1.9 for both the empirical
and counterfactual distributions. A one unit increase in ﬁrms' labor supply elasticity is
associated with a 9 percent reduction in the variance of the earnings distribution (0.94 to
0.86 log points). Similarly, we see decreases in the 90-10 ratio (1.32 to 1.3), 50-10 ratio (1.18
to 1.16), and 90-50 ratio (1.12 to 1.11).
These results could arise from a number of diﬀerent scenarios, the examination of which is
beyond the scope of the current paper. It may reﬂect low-ability workers having few outside
options for employment. This could be due to strict mobility constraints, a less eﬀective
job referral network (Ioannides and Loury, 2004), lower job search ability (Black, 1981),
or simply being qualiﬁed for fewer jobs. Another mechanism through which a ﬁrm's market
power might diﬀerentially aﬀect low wage workers is gender discrimination, as suggested
by Hirsch et al. (2010) or racial discrimination. These questions deserve a much deeper
treatment, and should be explored in future research.
Figure 1.3 plots both the empirical earnings distribution and the counterfactual distribu-
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tion under a more drastic assumption which more closely approximates perfect competition,
that each ﬁrm's labor supply elasticity is increased by a factor of 10 (median elasticity goes
from .74 to 7.4). The variance of the counterfactual distribution is considerably lower, with
nearly all of the movement occurring in the lower half of the distribution. The striking fact
about Figure 1.3 is that the Burdett and Mortensen model predicts this same behavior as
the arrival rate of job oﬀers increases.
Figure 1.3: Empirical and Counterfactual Distributions
It is important to note that the results in the counterfactual distribution are estimated
from a model which includes all person and ﬁrm controls, but no person or ﬁrm ﬁxed ef-
fects. This is because identifying oﬀ of within person/ﬁrm variation in a sense redeﬁnes
the unconditional quantiles of the distribution, and can introduce substantial bias into the
results. Given that the OLS estimates of the impact of ﬁrm market power are larger in the
speciﬁcations which include ﬁxed eﬀects, the results in Table 1.9 should be taken as lower
bounds.
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Discussion and Extensions
The labor supply elasticities reported in this paper imply that ﬁrms possess a high degree
of power in setting the wage. For a variety of reasons, these elasticities are on the lower end
of those present in the literature. In this section I address the factors which contribute to
these results.
First, it should be noted that the only other studies to estimate the labor supply elasticity
to the ﬁrm with comprehensive administrative data used European data. Given the very
restrictive (from the point of view of the employer) employment laws in place in many
European countries, this result is not surprising. Assuming that job security accrues over
time within ﬁrm but drops following a transition to a new ﬁrm, any law which makes it more
diﬃcult to ﬁre a worker eﬀectively lowers the cost to the employee of switching jobs because
job security is less of a factor.
One potential criticism of the labor supply elasticities derived in this paper is that the
data do not contain detailed occupation characteristics. This problem is mitigated by the
fact that the measures are constructed at the ﬁrm level in that I am only comparing workers
in the same ﬁrm in the construction of a ﬁrm's monopsony power. Additionally, previous
studies such as Hirsch et al. (2010) and Manning (2003) ﬁnd that the addition of individual-
level variables had little impact on the estimated labor supply elasticities and that it was
the addition of ﬁrm characteristics which altered the results. As a further check of this
problem, I compute the aggregate monopsony measures in the NLSY, as done in Manning
(2003), both with and without detailed occupation characteristics. As shown in Table 1.10,
I ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between these labor supply elasticities is about 0.2 and is not
statistically signiﬁcant. Keep in mind that even if this diﬀerence were statistically signiﬁcant,
the estimates in this paper are still a long way from implying perfect competition. Thus, I
conclude that the absence of occupation controls in the LEHD data will not seriously bias
the results of this study. Additionnally, the ﬁrm-level analyses performed in this paper were
estimated at the occupation level on a small subset of the LEHD data which does include
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occupation codes. The resulting labor supply elasticity distribution is quite similar to the
ﬁrm-level elasticity distribution.
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Table 1.10: Robustness Checks
*Panel A: NLSY
comparisons
With versus
without
occupational
eﬀects
Full history versus
partial history
Bootstrapped
diﬀerence in labor
supply elasticity
0.20 -.46
Std Error 0.14 .76
**Panel B:
Endogenous
mobility
corrections
Uncorrected labor
supply elasticity
Earnings of job
changers adjusted
downward
Control for
Heckman selection
correction
Median of
distribution
.75 .74 .76
*Panel A: Equations (15)-(17) were estimated on a sample of employment spells from the
NLSY79 from 1979-1996 (the last year for which detailed information on recruitment and
separation dates are available). The speciﬁcations include the same variables available
through the LEHD data: age, age-squared, year eﬀects, along with gender, ethnicity, race,
industry, and education indicators. The ﬁrst column compares the labor supply
elasticities with and without the inclusion of occupational ﬁxed eﬀects. The second
column compares the labor supply elasticities with and without the assumption that only
the last third of every individual's work history is known.
**Panel B: The second column represents a recalculation of the labor supply elasticity in
which workers who are recruited away from another job have their earnings adjusted
downward by the average premium of moving from job n to job n+1. The third column
represents a recalculation of the labor supply elasticity in which the inverse Mills ratio of
a Heckman selection model for mobility is controlled for in each of Equations (15)-(17).
The omitted category in the Heckman model is the number of new local jobs in each
workers current industry.
A potentially more serious problem in the estimation of the labor supply elasticity to
the ﬁrm is endogenous mobility. Consider the standard search theory model with on the job
search: A worker will leave their current job if they receive a higher wage oﬀer from another
ﬁrm. Their wage at the new ﬁrm is then endogenously determined since in eﬀect it was
drawn from a distribution truncated at the wage of the their previous job. In this sense, the
earnings data for those individuals who were hired away from another job is biased upward,
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which will bias estimates of the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm downward. I deal with
the endogenous mobility bias in several diﬀerent ways. First, I estimate the average earnings
premium an individual gets from moving to their nth job (where n is the job number in a
string of consecutive employment spells). For instance, workers' earnings increase on average
.19 log points when they move from their ﬁrst to their second jobs. I then reduce the earnings
of all job movers by the average premium associated with a move from job n-1 to n. For
example, all workers in their second jobs of a string of employment spells would have their
earnings reduced by .19 log points.14 The rationale behind this adjustment is that I only
observe workers moving from one job to another if they receive a higher wage oﬀer (This is
a typical assumption of on-the-job search models, and is overwhelmingly true in the data).
Thus, the earnings I observe in the second job are endogenously determined, since they were
in a sense drawn from a strictly positive oﬀer distribution.
Second, I recalculate the labor supply elasticities with a Heckman selection correction.
In this model I deﬁne the selected group as those who separate from one job to another, and
use the number of new jobs in an individual's state and industry as the excluded variable.
The logic behind this restriction is that the state-industry speciﬁc labor market should be
highly correlated with the likelihood that an individual moves to a new job, but should be
uncorrelated with that individual's unobserved ability to move. The inverse Mills ratio
from the Heckman selection model is included as a regressor in each of the Equations (15)-
(17). As noted in Table 1.10, each of these corrections leads to a trivial change in the labor
supply elasticity distribution.
One ﬁnal concern regarding endogenous mobility is that we do not observe the complete
history of workers, only that within the time-frame of the LEHD infrastructure. Thus, any
employment spells in progress at the beginning of our window which are the result of a
hire from another ﬁrm may introduce bias into the results. To assess the degree to which
14Deﬁne a string of employment spells as consecutive jobs an individual holds with no time spent outside
the labor force. In other words, each job transition in a string of employment spells is deﬁned as being
a separation to, or recruitment from, employment. An observation takes a default value of 1, 2 if the
employment spell is the second in a string of spells, etc.
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this is a problem, I again employ the NLSY79. I use a Monte Carlo approach to compare
the estimated labor supply elasticities using the complete worker histories and using only
employment spells which occurred in the ﬁnal third of the sample window. This is the
ideal comparison, where the ﬁrst calculation takes into account the entire work histories of
each individual and the second calculation uses only those spells observed after an arbitrary
date. The Monte Carlo analysis ﬁnds that using the complete worker histories leads to a
statistically insigniﬁcant decrease of the estimated labor supply elasticity. This implies that
the use of some partial histories in this study is not likely a problem, and at worst yields an
underestimate of monopsony power.
For the reasons mentioned in this section and probably many others, critics may claim
that this paper does not accurately estimate the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm, and they
could be right. As with any identiﬁcation strategy, this study relies on assumptions, not all
of which are testable. But while the average ﬁrm's labor supply elasticity may not be exactly
1.08, the variable which I call a supply elasticity is certainly some kind of weighted average
highly correlated with mobility and individuals' responsiveness to changes in earnings. The
fact that this measure is highly correlated with earnings, especially for those at the bottom
of the distribution, tells us that our economy is less competitive than we commonly assume.
6 Conclusion
This study ﬁnds evidence of signiﬁcant frictions in the US labor market, although the severity
of these frictions varies greatly between labor markets. I estimate the average ﬁrm's labor
supply elasticity to be quite monopsonistic at 1.08, however there is a nontrivial fraction of
ﬁrms who do appear to be operating in an approximately competitive labor market. While
identifying the precise frictions which contribute to ﬁrms' labor market power is beyond
the scope of this study, I can conclude that a ﬁrm's geographical dominance alone does not
account for all or even most of their ability to aﬀect the wage oﬀer distribution.
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I extend the dynamic model-based empirical strategy proposed by Manning (2003) to
identify ﬁrm level labor supply elasticities. The use of these measures of ﬁrm market power in
earnings regressions provides the ﬁrst direct test of the validity of the new monopsony model.
I ﬁnd that a one unit increase in a ﬁrm's labor supply elasticity is associated with at least
a 10 percent increase in earnings on average. Further exploring the earnings distribution,
I ﬁnd highly nonlinear eﬀects implying that the negative eﬀects of monopsony power are
concentrated at the lower end of the distribution. While these eﬀects are certainly not
trivial, it is important to note that there is evidence that ﬁrms only utilize a fraction of their
market power.
The development of the ﬁrm-level measures of labor market power described in this paper
could have a signiﬁcant impact on how we view the interaction of imperfect competition
with traditional models of the labor market. Future research will examine topics such as
gender/race wage gaps, minimum wage laws, unionization, labor demand over the business
cycle, agglomeration, and many others.
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Part II
Firm-Level Monopsony and the Gender
Pay Gap
Abstract
This study uses linked employer-employee data to estimate the labor supply elas-
ticity facing the ﬁrm, separately by gender, for a comprehensive sample of U.S. ﬁrms.
Using a dynamic model of labor supply, which identiﬁes the labor supply elasticity to
the ﬁrm oﬀ of job to job transitions, I ﬁnd evidence of substantial search frictions in
the economy, with females facing a higher level of frictions than males. However, the
majority of the gender gap in labor supply elasticities is driven by across ﬁrm sorting
rather than within ﬁrm diﬀerences, a feature predicted by the Bowlus (1997) equilib-
rium search model, but which has not been previously documented. On average, I ﬁnd
that males face a labor supply elasticity 0.15 points higher than females, a diﬀerential
which leads to 2.0% lower earnings for women (or about 9% of the adjusted gender earn-
ings gap). However, this is slightly less than half of the theoretically implied impact
which the previous literature has been forced to rely upon.
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1 Introduction
The male-female wage gap has long been a ﬁxture of the labor economics literature (see Al-
tonji and Blank (1999), Blau and Kahn (2008), or Bertrand (2011) for excellent summaries).
While certainly not true of all studies, an abundance of the literature evaluates factors which
contribute to the gap by (1) estimating wage equations controling for all observable charac-
teristics between men and women, (2) adjusting for diﬀerences in the observables through a
decomposition method, and (3) interpreting all or some of the remaining gap as discrimina-
tion or some other unobervable factor. The interaction between the model coeﬃcients and
the group level diﬀerences in each observable variable is taken to be the contribution of that
variable the wage gap. This is a perfectly reasonable strategy, and in eﬀect is exactly what
this study does.
The diﬀerence between this study and the previous literature is the ability to control for
detailed ﬁrm-level measures of labor market power. An assumption of most of the literature,
dating back to Becker (1971), is that the structural features of the labor market are the
same for both men and women. By this I mean that if we could perfectly control for all
ability-related personal characteristics then two workers at the same ﬁrm doing the same job
must be paid the same wage, and if not then the residual diﬀerence is due to discrimination.
Becker's analysis is underlied by the belief that the perfectly competitive market forces would
drive discriminating employers out of the labor market in the long run.
Recent evidence refutes these assumptions, ﬁnding signiﬁcant frictions in the labor market
Manning (2003); Webber (2012), as well as theoretical Bowlus (1997) and empirical (Ransom
and Oaxaca, 2010; Hirsch et al., 2010) evidence that these frictions may diﬀer by gender.
This implies that ﬁrm characteristics may play a large role in wage determination, and that
ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects would not be enough to explain the eﬀect of these frictions on the wage
gap. Additionally, it implies that part of the wage gap might be explainable through ﬁrms'
proﬁt maximization; in other words, price discrimination rather than taste discrimination.
Using the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) infrastructure, linked
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employer-employee data from the US Census Bureau, I separately estimate the labor supply
elasticities for men and women at nearly 100,000 ﬁrms spanning 47 states. This strategy
allows me to evaluate two distinct avenues through which ﬁrm market power may contribute
to the male-female wage gap, within ﬁrm and across ﬁrm disparities in the gender speciﬁc
labor supply elasticities. To understand the diﬀerence, consider an economy where the male
labor supply elasticity is greater (more competitive) than the female labor supply elasticity
by the same magnitude at every ﬁrm. Now consider a parallel economy with the same
aggregate diﬀerence in gender speciﬁc labor supply elasticities, but instead of each ﬁrm
having the same diﬀerential there is no diﬀerence in the elasticities at any ﬁrm but instead
women disproportionately work at ﬁrms with low labor supply elasticities.
In both economies the market-level labor supply elasticities for men and women and the
implied impact of market power on the wage gap are the same, but the mechanisms are
quite diﬀerent. In the ﬁrst economy women face less competition for their labor (potential
mechanisms will be discussed later), a fact which is exploited by ﬁrms in the form of lower
wages for equally qualiﬁed workers. In the second economy, each ﬁrm pays its workers the
same wage rate regardless of gender, with the diﬀerence in market-level wages arising from
segmentation of the labor force, with male-dominated ﬁrms operating in more competitive
labor markets than multi-sex ﬁrms. Note in this second economy traditional discrimination
is still very possible, but it operates through the employment margin rather than the wage
margin.
Using a dynamic labor supply model to separately estimate male and female labor supply
elasticities for each ﬁrm in my sample, I ﬁnd strong evidence of across-ﬁrm labor supply
elasticity diﬀerentials, but only small within-ﬁrm diﬀerentials. At ﬁrms where I am able to
estimate both a male and female elasticity, I ﬁnd average (worker-weighted) labor supply
elasticities of 0.98 and 0.94 for men and women respectively. However, the average labor
supply elasticities are 1.09 and 0.94 for men and women respectively when I examine ﬁrms
for which I can estimate at least one of the gender-speciﬁc elasticities. Furthermore, I can
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directly estimate the impact of the gender gap in search frictions on the male-female earnings
gap. I estimate that on average gender-speciﬁc search frictions lead to 2.0% lower earnings
for women relative to men.
This paper contributes to the current literature in several important ways. First, the
previous literature has only been able to examine how labor supply elasticities diﬀer by
gender at the market level. Thus, this literature can only produce two market-level elasticities
(one male and one female), whereas the current paper produces ﬁrm-speciﬁc elasticities for
more than one hundered thousand ﬁrms. This allows me to characterize the distribution and
composition of the gender labor supply elasticity gap (within versus across ﬁrm, industry,
etc.). Second, when evaluating the impact of imperfect competition on the gender wage gap,
the previous literature has been forced to provide a theoretically implied impact (because
two market-level elasticities cannot be used in statistical inference) rather than a directly
estimated impact as is done in this study. I ﬁnd that the theoretically implied impact
drastically overstates the directly estimated impact. Finally, the model used in this study
is considerably more ﬂexible than the gender pay gap models which have previously been
estimated, allowing for substantially more ﬁrm heterogeneity as well as allowing the labor
supply elasticity to vary over time.
The paper is organized as follows, Section 2 describes motivation behind looking at
the gender wage gap through a monopsony perspective. Section 3 discusses the previous
literature. Section 4 lays out the theoretical foundation for this study. The data and methods
are described in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results and sensitivity analyses, and Section
7 concludes.
2 Monopsony and the Gender Pay Gap
The concept of monopsony was ﬁrst deﬁned and explored as a model by Robinson (1933).
In her seminal work, Robinson formulated the analysis which is still taught in undergraduate
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labor courses. Monopsony literally means one buyer, and although the term is most often
used in a labor market context, it can also refer to a ﬁrm which is the only buyer of an input.
It should be pointed out that in the new monopsony framework, the word monopsony
is synonymous with the following phrases: monopsonistic competition, oligopsony, imperfect
competition, ﬁnite labor supply elasticity, or upward sloping labor supply curve to the ﬁrm.
While the classic monopsony model is based on the idea of a single ﬁrm as the only outlet
for which workers can supply labor, the new framework deﬁnes monopsony as any departure
from the assumptions of perfect competition. Additionally, the degree of monopsonistic
competition may vary signiﬁcantly across labor markets, and even across ﬁrms within a
given labor market.
Webber (2012) discusses in detail some of the many potential sources of a ﬁrm's monop-
sony power, including: geographic constraints, moving costs, ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital,
job security, asymetric information, compensating diﬀerentials, and more. In this study, I
will focus instead on factors which may cause a diﬀerence in the labor supply elasticities for
men and women.
Many of the factors which may cause a diﬀerence in the male and female labor supply
elasticities are sociological in nature. For example, on average the male's job within a
marriage is the dominant job. So a family may make locational decisions based primarily
on the job prospects for the husband, thus forcing the wife to search for a job only in a
local labor market centered around her husbands place of employment. Women may also
place a greater importance on non-wage beneﬁts oﬀered by employers, such as ﬂexible work
schedules or other family-friendly practices which limit the number of jobs which are suitable.
For instance, if female workers are more risk averse, in terms of either job or earnings stability,
than their male counterparts, then this may act as a compensating diﬀerential which would
manifest itself in the form of a lower labor supply elasticity (Bonin et al., 2007). Additionally,
since the core cause of a ﬁrm's monopsony power lies in the fact that workers do not have an
inﬁnite stream of job oﬀers, discrimination in the hiring process against women would lead to
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a lower labor supply elasticity (and thus lower wages) even for women at nondiscriminating
ﬁrms because they would have fewer outside options. This is an important point which is
explored within the context of an equilibrium search model in Black (1995).
Much of the recent labor literature views monopsony power through a search theory
context, a framework which has also been used to model gender wage diﬀerentials. Bowlus
(1997) extends the standard on the job search model to allow for an individual to occupy one
of three states (employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation), and allows the under-
lying search parameters to vary by gender. A structural estimation of this model using the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) in 1979 concludes that the search behavior
of men and women is statistically diﬀerent, with women facing a lower arrival rate of job
oﬀers and having a higher separation rate than men. Bowlus (1997) ﬁnds that this diﬀerence
in search behavior explains between 20 and 30 percent of the gender wage gap. Furthermore,
Bowlus (1997) concludes that this diﬀerential would likely manifest itself through ﬁrm seg-
mentation by gender rather, with women more likely to work in low wage ﬁrms due to the
diﬀerence in search behavior rather than within-ﬁrm diﬀerences in pay.
3 Previous Literature
The empirical monopsony literature dates back to Bunting (1962), with the predominant
method being the use of concentration ratios, the share of a labor market which a given ﬁrm
employs. The most commonly examined market in this literature has been that of nurses
in rural hospitals (Hurd, 1973; Feldman and Scheer, 1982; Hirsch and Schumacher, 1995;
Link and Landon, 1975; Adamache and Sloan, 1982; Link and Settle, 1979). This market
lends itself to monopsony because nurses have a highly speciﬁc form of human capital and
there are many rural labor markets where hospitals are the dominant employer. Despite the
relatively large literature on this narrow labor market, the concentration ratio approach has
yielded mixed results and no clear consensus.
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More recently, studies have attempted to directly estimate the average slope of the labor
supply curve faced by the ﬁrm, which is a distinct concept from the market labor supply
elasticity15. Studying the market for nurses, Sullivan (1989) ﬁnds evidence of monopsony
using a semistructural approach to measure the diﬀerence between nurses' marginal product
of labor and their wages. Examining another market commonly thought to be monopsonistic,
the market for schoolteachers, Ransom and Sims (2010) instrument wages with collectively
bargained pay scales and estimate a labor supply elasticity between 3 and 4. In a novel
approach using German administrative data, Schmieder (2010) ﬁnds evidence of a positive
sloping labor supply curve through an analysis of new establishments.
Manning (2003) formalized a method for identifying the labor supply elasticity facing
the ﬁrm oﬀ of job to job transitions. This dynamic model of labor supply, which derives
its roots from Card and Krueger (1995) and the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) equilibrium
search model, is the basisfor the model used in this paper. Applying the model to survey
data, Manning (2003) ﬁnds labor supply elasticities ranging from 0.68 in the NLSY to 1.38
in the PSID. In a developing country context, Brummund (2011) uses a novel structural
production function approach, and ﬁnds strong evidence of monopsony in Indonesian labor
markets, estimating labor supply elasticities between 0.6 and 1.0.
A dynamic model of labor supply approach has also been used to evaluate the link between
monopsony and the gender pay gap. Two careful studies, Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) and
Hirsch et al. (2010) both separately estimate the labor supply elasticities to the ﬁrm at the
market level of men and women, each ﬁnding strong evidence of monopsonistic competition.
Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) use data from a chain of grocery stores, and ﬁnd labor supply
elasticities of about 2.5 for men and 1.6 for women. Hirsch et al. (2010) uses administrative
data from Germany to estimate elasticities ranging from 2.5-3.6 and 1.9-2.5 for men and
women respectively. These studies conclude that at least one third of the wage gap between
15The market labor supply elasticity corresponds to the decision of a worker to enter the labor force, while
the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm corresponds to the decision of whether to supply labor to a particular
ﬁrm. This paper focuses on the ﬁrm-level decision.
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men and women can be attributed to ﬁrm-level monopsony. It is important to note that this
cannot be directly tested in the data used in these studies, but rather is theoretically implied
by the diﬀerence in gender-speciﬁc elasticities at the market level. It should be noted that
the proposed link between the gender pay gap and monopsony is not a new idea in the labor
literature, with Madden (1973) devoting an entire book to this topic.
The closest analogue to this study in terms of method and data is Webber (2012), which
uses linked employer employee data from the U.S. Census Bureau and an extended dynamic
labor supply model to study ﬁrm-level monopsony. Webber (2012) is the ﬁrst to estimate
labor supply elasticities at the ﬁrm-level, and is also the ﬁrst to demonstrate the link between
ﬁrm-level elasticities and the earnings of workers.
4 Theoretical Model
Equilibrium search models are the theoretical basis underlying most of the recent monopsony
literature. The seminal model of an economy with search frictions is that of Burdett and
Mortensen (1998). They develop a model of the economy with on-the-job search in which
employers post wages based on the wage-posting behavior of competing employers. Even
assuming equal ability for all workers, wage dispersion is an equilibrium outcome as long
as one assumes that the arrival rate of job oﬀers is positive but ﬁnite (perfect competition
characterizes the limiting case, as the arrival rate tends to inﬁnity). Also part of the Burdett-
Mortensen class of search models, and of particular relevance to the present study, is Bowlus
(1997). The Bowlus model allows for individuals to be out of the labor force and not be search
for a job (nonparticipation) in addition to the standard employed and unemployed states.
While I do not explicity estimate either the Burdett and Mortensen or the Bowlus models in
this paper, the intuition of monopsony power derived from search frictions is central to this
study. The following is a description of the dynamic labor supply model which I estimate.
Assume there are Mt equally productive workers (where productivity is given by p), each
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gaining utility b from leisure. Further assume there are Me constant returns to scale ﬁrms
which are inﬁnitesimally small when compared to the entire economy. A ﬁrm sets wage w
to maximize steady-state proﬁts pi = (p-w)N(w) where N(w) represents the supply of labor
to the ﬁrm. Also deﬁne F(w) as the cdf of wage oﬀers observed in the economy, and f(w) is
the corresponding pdf. All workers within a ﬁrm must be paid the same wage. Employed
workers will accept a wage oﬀer w' if it is greater than their current wage w, and non-
employed workers will accept w' if w'=b where b is their reservation wage. Wage oﬀers are
drawn randomly from the distribution F(w), and arrive to all workers at rate λ. Assume
an exogenous job destruction rate δ, and that all workers leave the job market at rate δ
to be replaced in nonemployment by an equivalent number of workers. RN denotes The
recruitment ﬂow and separation rate functions are given by:
R(w) = RN + λ
∫ w
0
f(x)N(x)dx (19)
s(w) = δ + λ(1− F (w)) (20)
Burdett and Mortensen (1998), or alternatively Manning (2003), show that in this econ-
omy, as long as λ is positive and ﬁnite, there will be a nondegenerate distribution of wages
even when all workers are equally productive. As λ tends to zero, the wage distribution will
collapse to the monopsony wage, which in this particular economy would be the reservation
wage b. As λ tends to inﬁnity the wage distribution will collapse to the perfectly competitive
wage, the marginal product of labor p.
Note that the following primarily relies on the model presented in Manning (2003), and
incorporates a key insight from the recent working paper by Depew and Sorensen (2011) to
derive the least restrictive formula for the labor supply elasticity facing the ﬁrm currently in
the literature. We can recursively formulate the supply of labor to a ﬁrm with the following
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equation, where R(w) is the ﬂow of recruits to a ﬁrm and s(w) is the separation rate.
Nt(w) = Nt−1(w)[1− st−1(w)] +Rt−1(w) (21)
Equation (21) formalizes the deﬁnitionally true statement that a ﬁrm's employment this
period is equal to the fraction of workers from last period who stay with the ﬁrm plus the
number of new recruits. Noting that Nt = γNt−1 where γ is the rate of employment growth
between period t-1 and t, we can rewrite Equation (21) as
Nt(w) =
Rt(w)
1− (1− st(w)) 1γt
(22)
Taking the natural log of each side, multiplying by w, and diﬀerentiating we can write the
elasticity of labor supply, ε, at time t as a function of the long-run elasticities of recruitment
and separations, as well as the contemporary separation and growth rates.
εt = εR − εS st(w)
γt + st(w)− 1 (23)
We can further decompose the recruitment and separation elasticities in the following
way
εt = θ
RεER + (1− θR)εNR − θSεES
sEt (w)
γt + sEt (w)− 1
− (1− θS)εNS
sNt (w)
γt + sNt (w)− 1
(24)
Where the elasticity of recruitment has been broken down into the elasticity of recruit-
ment of workers from employment (εER) and the elasticity of recruitment of workers from
nonemployment (εNR ). Similarly the elasticity of separation has been decomposed into the
elasticity of separation to employment (εES ) and the elasticity of separation to nonemploy-
ment (εNS ). θ
Rand θS represent the share of recruits from employment and the share of
separations to employment respectively.
While there are established methods for estimating separation elasticities with standard
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job-ﬂow data, recruitment elasticities are not identiﬁed without detailed information about
every job oﬀer a worker receives. Therefore, it would be helpful to express the elasticities of
recruitment from employment and noemployment as functions of estimable quantities.
Looking ﬁrst at the elasticity of recruitment from employment, we can write the recruit-
ment from employment function and its derivative as
RE(w) = λ
∫ w
0
f(x)N(x)dx (25)
∂RE(w)
∂w
= λf(w)N(w) (26)
Combining Equations (22), (25), and (26), along with the deﬁnition of an elasticity
(εER =
w
RE(w)
∂RE(w)
∂w
), we get:
εER =
wλf(w)
1 +
sEt (w)
γt
− 1
γt
(27)
In dealing with the numerator, note that the the derivative of the separation to employ-
ment function, sE(w) = λ(1− F (w)), is
∂sE(w)
∂w
= −λf(w) (28)
Combining equations (27), (28), and the deﬁnition of an elasticity (εEs =
w
sE(w)
∂sE(w)
∂w
), we
can write the elasticity of recruitment from employment as a function of estimable quantities:
εER =
−εES sEt (w)
1 +
sEt (w)
γt
− 1
γt
(29)
Next, Manning (2003, p. 100) notes that the elasticity of recruitment from nonemploy-
ment can be written as
εNR = ε
E
R − wθ‘R(w)/θR(w)(1− θR(w)) (30)
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This is derived from the simple deﬁnition of θR, the share of total recruits which come
from employment, which implies RN = RE(1 − θR)/θR, where RN and RE are the recruits
from nonemployment and employment respectively. Taking the natural log of each side of
this relation and diﬀerentiating yields the relation depicted in Equation (30). The second
term on the right-hand side of Equation (30) can be thought of as the bargaining premium
that an employee receives from searching while currently employed. Thus, the labor supply
elasticity to the ﬁrm can be written as a function of both separation elasticities, the premium
to searching while employed, and the calculated separation and growth rates. This study
estimates the above parameters separately by gender, thus yielding gender-speciﬁc labor
supply elasticities to the ﬁrm for every available ﬁrm.
The model presented above implies that, even in a world where all ﬁrms are identical and
individuals posess equal ability, a diﬀerence in the job oﬀer arrival rate across gender will
lead to a gender wage gap. This is true even for ﬁrms who do not discriminate in a taste-
based sense. To see how a ﬁrm's labor supply elasticity aﬀects the wage it pays, consider a
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm which faces the following objective function:
Max
w
Π = pQ(LM)− wMLM(wM) + pQ(LF )− wFLF (wF ) (31)
P is the price of the output produced according to the production function Q. The choice
of wage w determines the male and female labor supplied to the ﬁrm LM and LF respectively
. Taking ﬁrst order conditions, substituting ε = w
L(w)
∂L(w)
∂w
, and solving for the gender-speciﬁc
wage yields:
wM =
pQ′(LM)
1 + 1
εM
(32)
wF =
pQ′(LF )
1 + 1
εF
(33)
The numerator in Equation (33) is simply the marginal product of labor, and εM and εF
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are the gender-speciﬁc labor supply elasticities faced by the ﬁrm. It is easy to see that in
the case of perfect competition (ε = ∞) that the wage is equal to the marginal product of
labor, but the wage is less than then marginal product for all 0 < ε <∞.
5 Data and Methodology
Data
This study uses linked employer-employee data from the U.S. Census Bureau to estimate the
gender-speciﬁc ﬁrm level labor supply elasticities. The Longitudinal Employer Household
Dynamics (LEHD) data are built primarily from Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records,
which cover approximately 98 percent of wage and salary payments in private sector non-farm
jobs. Information about the ﬁrms is constructed from the Quarterly Census of Employment
and Wages (QCEW). The LEHD infrastructure allows users to follow both workers and ﬁrms
over time, as well as to identify workers who share a common employer. Firms in these data
are deﬁned at the state level, which means that a Walmart in Florida and a Walmart in
Georgia would be considered to be diﬀerent ﬁrms. However, all Walmarts in Florida are
considered to be part of the same ﬁrm. These data also include demographic characteristics
of the worker and basic ﬁrm characteristics, obtained through administrative record and
statistical links. For a complete description of these data, see Abowd et al. (2009).
My sample consists of quarterly observations on earnings and employment for 47 states
between 1990 and 200816. I make several sample restrictions in an attempt to obtain the most
economically meaningful results. These restrictions are necessary in large part because the
earnings data are derived from tax records, and thus any payment made to an individual,
no matter how small, will appear in the sample. As a consequence, there are many job
spells which appear to last only one quarter, but are in fact one-time payments which do
16The states not in the sample are Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Not all states are
in the LEHD infrastructure for the entire time-frame, but once a state enters it is in the sample for all
subsequent periods.
56
not conform with the general view of a job match between a ﬁrm and worker.
First, I only include an employment spell in the sample if at some point it could be
considered the dominant job, deﬁned as paying the highest wage of an individual's jobs in a
given quarter17. I also remove all spells which span fewer than three quarters.18 This sample
restriction is related to the construction of the earnings variable. Since the data do not
contain information on when in the quarter an individual was hired/separated, the entries
for the ﬁrst and last quarters of any employment spell will almost certainly underestimate the
quarterly earnings rate (unless the individual was hired on the ﬁrst day or left employment
on the last day of a quarter). Thus, in order to get an accurate measurement of the earnings
rate I must observe an individual in at least one quarter other than the ﬁrst or last of an
employment spell. I remove job spells which have average earnings greater than $1 million
per quarter and less than $100 per quarter, which corresponds approximately to the top and
bottom 1 percent of observations
Additionally, I limit the analysis to ﬁrms with at least 100 total employment spells of any
length over the lifespan of the ﬁrm, and 25 employment spells in each estimating equation.
After making these restrictions, I am left with two samples of interest, All workers for whom
I can estimate a gender-speciﬁc labor supply elasticity, and workers who work at ﬁrms where
I can identify both a male and female elasticity. The ﬁrst sample is made up of roughly 242
million employment spells, belonging to about 105 million unique individuals, who work at
approximately 250 thousand separate ﬁrms. The sample requiring each ﬁrm to have both a
male and female labor supply elasticity has roughly 183 million employment spells, belonging
to about 84 million unique individuals, who work at approximately 100 thousand separate
ﬁrms.
17This formulation allows an individual to have more than one dominant job in a given quarter. The
rationale behind this deﬁnition is that I wish to include all job spells where the wage is important to the
worker. The vast majority of job spells in my sample, 89.9 percent, have 0 or 1 quarters of overlap with
other job spells. Restricting the dominant job deﬁnition to only allow one dominant job at a given time does
not alter the reported results.
18The relaxation of this assumption does not appreciably alter any of the reported results.
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Empirical Strategy
T\he construction of the labor supply elasticities presented in this paper most closely rep-
resents an augmented gender-by-ﬁrm level implementation of the methodology proposed in
Manning (2003), with the extension allowing for a time-varying elasticity described above.
According to the results presented in the theoretical model section, three quantities
must be estimated in order to construct the labor supply elasticity measure, (εES , ε
N
S and
wθR
′
(w)/θR(w)(1 − θR(w))), as well as the calculated recruitment share, separation share,
growth rate, and separation rate for each ﬁrm. Each of the following models is run separately
by gender for every ﬁrm in the sample, where the unit of observation is an employment spell.
Looking ﬁrst at the separation elasticities, I model separations to nonemployment as a Cox
proportional hazard model given by
λN(t|βN,seplog(earnings)i +XiγN,sep) = λ0(t) exp(βN,seplog(earnings)i +XiγN,sep) (34)
where λ() is the hazard function, λ0 is the baseline hazard, t is the length of employment,
log(earnings) is the natural log of individual i's average quarterly earnings, and X is a vector
of explanatory variables including race, age, education, ﬁrm size, and year control variables
(time-invariant ﬁrm characteristics such as industry cannot be included because the model
is run at the ﬁrm level). While the entire sample will be used, workers who transition to a
new employer or who are with the same employer at the end of the data series are considered
to have a censored employment spell. In this model, the parameter β represents an estimate
of the separation elasticity to nonemployment. In an analogous setting, I model separations
to employment as
λE(t|βE,seplog(earnings)
i
+Xiγ
E,sep) = λ0(t) exp(β
E,seplog(earnings)i +Xiγ
E,sep) (35)
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with the only diﬀerence being that the sample is restricted to those workers who do not
have a job transition to nonemployment. As before, β represents an estimate of the sepa-
ration elasticity to employment. To estimate the third quantity needed for equation (24),
wθ‘R(w)/θR(w)(1− θR(w)), Manning (2003) shows that this is equivalent to the coeﬃcient
on log earnings when estimating the following logistic regression
Prec =
exp(βE,reclog(earnings)i +Xiγ
E,rec)
1 + exp(βE,reclog(earnings)i +XiγE,rec)
(36)
where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if a worker was recruited from employment
and 0 if they were recruited from nonemployment. To enable this coeﬃcient to vary over
time, log earnings is interacted with time dummies. The same explanatory variables used
in the separation equations are used in this logistic regression. At this point the results
listed in the theoretical section can be used (along with calculating the share of recruits and
separations to employment, separation rates, and growth rates for each ﬁrm) in conjunction
with equation (24) to produce an estimate of the labor supply elasticity facing each ﬁrm. 19
To provide some intuition on the models being estimated, consider the analysis of sepa-
rations to employment. A large (in absolute value) coeﬃcient on the log earnings variable
implies that a small decrease in an individual's earnings will greatly increase the probability
of separating in any given period. In a perfectly competitive economy, we would expect this
coeﬃcient to be inﬁnitely high. Similarly, a small coeﬃcient implies that the employer can
lower the wage rate without seeing a substantial decline in employment. One concern with
this procedure is that this measure of monopsony power is actually proxying for high-wage
ﬁrms, reﬂecting an eﬃciency wage view of the economy where ﬁrms pay a wage considerably
above the market wage in exchange for lower turnover. This is directly testable, and is
rejected as an explanation later in the paper.
19Each equation was also estimated with an indicator variable for whether the employment spell was in
progress at the beginning of the data window to correct for potential bias of truncated records. Additionally,
all models were reestimated using only job spells for which the entire job spell was observed, with no
substantial diﬀerences observed betweeen these models.
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Analysis
In order to directly estimate the impact of ﬁrm-level monopsony on the gender pay gap,
we must estimate two quantities: the male-female gap in labor supply elasticities and the
impact of the labor supply elasticitiy on earnings. The elasticity gap can be derived from
the above results. The impact of the labor supply elasticity on earnings can be estimated
from the following equation.
log(quarterly earningsij) = βelasticityjg + γXij + δYj + θZi + εij (37)
The dependent variable is the natural log of individual i's quarterly earnings in employ-
ment spell j. The elasticity variable represents the gender speciﬁc elasticity of ﬁrm j and
gender g. X is a vector of person and ﬁrm characteristics, which may vary by the employ-
ment spell, including age, age-squared, tenure (quarters employed at ﬁrm), tenure-squared,
education20, race, ethnicity, year eﬀects, indicator variables for the two-digit NAICS sector,
and the size (employment) of the ﬁrm. Y is a vector of ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, Z is a vector of
person ﬁxed-eﬀects, and ε is the error term. Time-invariant characteristics in X are excluded
in models with person or ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects.
6 Results
Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for both men and women in my sample. Since the
unit of observation is the employment spell, and only dominant jobs are included, some
statistics deviate slightly from typical observational studies of the labor market. The average
20Reported educational attainment is only available for about 10 percent of the sample, although sophis-
ticated imputations of education are available for the entire sample. The results presented in this paper
correspond the the full sample of workers (reported education and imputed education). All models were also
run on the sample with no imputed data, and no substantive diﬀerences were observed. In particular, since
the preferred speciﬁcation includes person ﬁxed-eﬀects, and thus educational attainment drops out of the
model, this is of little concern.
60
employment spell lasts about two and a half years, with more than sixty percent of spells
resulting from a move from another job. Of particular importance to this study, is that the
raw earnings gap between men and women is about 0.34 log points. The quarterly nature of
the LEHD data make it diﬃcult to precisely identify21 whether an individual separated to
employment or nonemployment, and therefore the proportion of separations to employment
is slightly higher than comparable statistics reported in Manning (2003).
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Men Women
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Age 38 14 38 14
Tenure (Quarters) 10.2 11.1 10.1 10.83
Log(Quarterly Earnings) 8.68 1 8.34 0.94
White 0.78 0.42 0.76 0.43
Hispanic 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.33
< High School 0.17 0.37 0.13 0.33
High School Degree 0.29 0.46 0.28 0.45
Some College 0.3 0.46 0.34 0.47
College Degree+ 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43
To give the reader some intuition about the type of ﬁrms in my sample, the median ﬁrm
employs roughly 400 workers, hiring 75, in a given quarter. keep in mind that these statistics
are not point in time calculations, but rather totals throughout an entire quarter. Addition-
ally, remember that these are at the ﬁrm (state-level) rather than at the establishement
(individual unit) level.
Firm-Level Measure
Table 2.2 presents the elasticities estimated through Equations (34)-(36) broken down by
gender. The ﬁrst four columns report the average (weighted by employment) ﬁrm-level elas-
21The deﬁnition used in this paper requires an individual to have no reported earnings for an entire quarter
following an employment spell to be deﬁned as a separation to nonemployment, with all other separations
coded as a separation to employment. This deﬁnition was chosen because it lead to the most conservative
(least monopsonistic) results, although the diﬀerences were small. The other methods tried involved imputing
the time during the quarter at which employment stopped/started based on a comparison of the earnings
reported in the last/ﬁrst quarter to a quarter in which I know the individual worked the entire quarter.
61
ticities of recruitment from employment and nonemployment, and the separation elasticities
to employment and nonemployment respectively. The ﬁnal column combines these elastici-
ties, along with the calculated shares of separations/recruits to/from employment to obtain
the labor supply elasticity.
Table 2.2: Firm-Level Labor Supply Elasticities
Model εER ε
N
R ε
E
S ε
N
S ε
Male Elasticities
No Controls .47 .11 -.47 -.62 .96
Full Model .54 .13 -.54 -.7 1.09
Female Elasticities
No Controls .39 .09 -.39 -.62 .83
Full Model .45 .1 -.45 -.7 .94
The ﬁrst row of each panel represents estimates from equations (34)-(36) where the only
regressor in each model is log earnings. The second row estimates the same equations, and
includes age, age-squared, ﬁrm size, along with indicator variables for nonwhite, Hispanic,
completing a high school diploma, some college, and college degree or greater, and year
eﬀects. The ﬁrst four columns report the average ﬁrm-level elasticities of recruitment from
employment and nonemployment, and the separation elasticities to employment and
nonemployment respectively. The ﬁnal column combines these elasticities, along with the
calculated shares of separations/recruits to/from employment, separation rates, and
growth rates to obtain the labor supply elasticity facing the ﬁrm.
The results detailed in Table 2.2 are notable in two regards. First, the average labor
supply elasticities (0.94 for women and 1.09 for men) are fairly monopsonistic, implying a high
degree of market power for ﬁrms22. This is consistent with previous work utilizing dynamic
labor supply models such as Manning (2003) or Webber (2012). It is important to note
that Webber (2012) ﬁnds that ﬁrms do not appear to exploit all of their wage-setting power.
Second, the diﬀerence between the male and female labor supply elasticities is considerable
(1.09 to 0.94)23, with the gap implying men should earn approximately 7.5% more than
women solely as a result of the disparity in labor supply elasticities24. This corresponds
to about 22% of the raw gender wage gap in my sample, and 33% of the gap when basic
22A number of robustness check (equivalent to Webber (2012)) were run to test for threats to identiﬁcation
such as endogenous mobility. No signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the estimated labor supply elasticities were found
under any of these alternative speciﬁcations. Results are available upon request.
23Interestingly, this gap has remained nearly constant throughout the timeframe of my sample.
24Calculated using Equations (33) and (33)
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observables are controlled for (based on the regressions to be presented below). Finally, we
see that the diﬀerence in labor supply elasticities between men and women is driven by the
diﬀerence between the separation and recruitment elasticities to/from employment. In the
context of a search model, this implies that the increased search frictions for women are due
more to a lower job oﬀer arrival rate as opposed to a higher job destruction rate.
Table 2.3 displays information about the distribution of labor supply elasticities for men
and women in two diﬀerent samples. The ﬁrst sample, the same used in Table 2.2, represents
all men and women for whom I was able to estimate a labor supply elasticity (given the
restrictions mentioned in the data section). The second sample only includes individuals who
work at ﬁrms where I am able to estimate both a male and female labor supply elasticity.
As shown in Table 2.3, there is only a small gender diﬀerential when looking within ﬁrms.
Thus nearly the entire elasticity gap between men and women is driven by diﬀerences across
ﬁrms, with women disproportionately working at low-elasticity (and therefore low-wage)
ﬁrms. This conforms with predictions from the early gender diﬀerential literature (Blau,
1977; Groshen, 1991) and the equilibrium search model of Bowlus (1997).
Table 2.3: Distribution of Estimated Firm-Level Labor Supply Elasticities
Percentiles
Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
All workers
Men 1.09 0.22 0.45 0.78 1.24 1.94
Women 0.94 0.23 0.43 0.72 1.08 1.58
Only ﬁrms with both elasticities
Men 0.98 0.23 0.44 0.75 1.15 1.69
Women 0.94 0.26 0.46 0.74 1.08 1.54
*Three separate regressions, corresponding to equations (34)-(36), were
estimated separately by gender for each ﬁrm in the data which met the
conditions described in the data section. The coeﬃcients on log earnings in
each regression were combined, weighted by the share of recruits and
separations to employment, separation rates, and growth rates according to
equation (24) to obtain the estimate of the labor supply elasticity to the
ﬁrm. Demographic and human capital controls include: age, age-squared,
and indicator variables for ethnicity, racial status, and education level.
Employer controls include number of employees working at the ﬁrm and
industry indicator variables. Year eﬀects are included in all models.
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Table 2.4 reports average labor supply elasticities broken down by NAICS sector. The
most competitive industries among men are the manufacturing and mining/oil/natural gas
sectors, while the least competitive are the administrative support and accomodation/food
service sectors. Among women, the most competitive industries are manufacturing and
transportation, while the least competitive are the administrative support and health care
sectors. The low elasticity for female healthcare workers is consistent with the focus of most
of the early monopsony literature's focus on the market for nurses. The male labor supply
elasticity is greater than or equal to the female labor supply elasticity in 18 of the 20 sectors,
and only slightly smaller in the other two. By far, the greatest elasticity diﬀerential can be
found in the construction industry, where men face an elasticity of 1.39 compared to 0.92
for women.
64
Table 2.4: Mean Labor Supply Elasticity by NAICS Sector and Gender
NAICS Sector Male Labor Supply
Elasticity
Female Labor
Supply Elasticity
Agriculture 1.35 1.25
Mining/Oil/Natural Gas 1.51 1.3
Utilities 1.18 1.03
Construction 1.39 0.92
Manufacturing 1.67 1.66
Wholesale Trade 1.38 1.27
Resale Trade 1.01 0.96
Transportation 1.44 1.38
Information 1.11 1.11
Finance and Insurance 1.13 1.2
Real Estate and Rental 0.99 0.94
Professional/Scientiﬁc/Technical Services 1.06 1.03
Management of Companies 1.08 1.04
Administrative Support 0.64 0.64
Educational Services 0.95 0.9
Health Care and Social Assistance 0.77 0.75
Arts and Entertainment 0.96 0.87
Accommodation and Food Services 0.76 0.84
Other Services 1.04 0.93
Public Administration 1.28 1.11
*The numbers in this table represent averages by NAICS sector of the
estimated labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm. Three separate regressions,
corresponding to equations (34)-(36), were estimated separately by gender
for each ﬁrm in the data which met the conditions described in the data
section. The coeﬃcients on log earnings in each regression were combined,
weighted by the share of recruits and separations to employment, separation
rates, and growth rates according to equation (24) to obtain the estimate of
the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm. Demographic and human capital
controls include: age, age-squared, and indicator variables for ethnicity, racial
status, and education level. Employer controls include the number of
employees working at the ﬁrm. Year eﬀects are included in all models.
Now that we have estimated the gender elasticity gap, we now turn to the question of
how much of the gender earnings gap can be explained by the diﬀerence in labor supply
elasticities. Previous studies, which only were able to estimate elasticities at the market
level, were forced to interpolate the impact on the gender pay gap. As mentioned above,
the theoretical impact implied by my results is men earning 7.5% more than women due to
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diﬀerences in search frictions. Table 2.5 presents a series of log-earnings regressions25 which
allow me to directly estimate this impact due to the ﬁrm-level nature of the elasticities
generated by this study. In the model with the most detailed set of controls ( ﬁrm ﬁxed-
eﬀects) I ﬁnd a coeﬃcient of 0.12 on the gender-speciﬁc labor supply elasticity, which implies
that a labor supply elasticity diﬀerential of 0.15 will lead to a gender earnings gap of 2.0%,
less than half of the theoretically predicted value26. This corresponds to about 6% of the
raw gender wage gap in my sample and 9% of the gender wage gap after controlling for the
observables available in this study.
Also of note in Table 2.5 is how the coeﬃcient on the gender-speciﬁc labor supply elasticity
variable changes as person and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects are added. The noticable increase in the
coeﬃcient, both when ﬁrm and person eﬀects are added to the model, imply that on average
low-wage ﬁrms have higher labor supply elasticities, and low-wage workers have higher labor
supply elasticities. This is in line with the current thinking regarding monopsony power and
its interaction with skilled and unskilled labor (Stevens, 1994; Muehlemann et al., 2010).
25Table 2.5 depicts regressions run on the sample of workers who work at ﬁrms where both a male and
female labor supply elasticity can be estimated. These regressions were also run on the entire sample, as
well as on only the male and female samples, with nearly identical results.
26(exp(.2)− 1) ∗ .15
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Table 2.5: Impact of Search Frictions on Earnings
Coeﬃcient on labor
supply elasticity
0.14 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.12
Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employer controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State ﬁxed-eﬀects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Person ﬁxed-eﬀects No No No No No Yes No
Firm ﬁxed-eﬀects No No No No No No Yes
R-Squared 0.005 0.233 0.308 0.329 0.336 0.815 0.90
*A pooled national sample of all dominant employment spells, at ﬁrms which have
estimated elasticities for each gender, subject to the sample restriction described
in the data section is used in this set of regressions. The dependent variable is the
natural log of quarterly earnings. Demographic controls include: age, age-squared,
and indicator variables for gender, ethnicity, racial status, and education level.
Employer controls include the number of employees working at the ﬁrm and
industry indicator variables. Tenure controls include the length (in quarters) of
the employment spell, as well as its squared term. Year eﬀects are included in all
models. These results are unweighted, however all models were also estimated
with demographic weights constructed by the author. There were no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the weighted and unweighted models. Standard errors are not
reported because the t-statistics are greater than 200 in all models. Clustering
these standard errors at various levels does not aﬀect the statistical signiﬁcance.
All standard errors and other estimated coeﬃcients are available upon request.
There are approximately 183,000,000 observations in each speciﬁcation.
There is reason to believe that the estimates in Table 2.5 are lower bounds of the true
impact of ﬁrm monopsony power on earnings. Each labor supply elasticity is a weighted
average of many more precisely deﬁned elasticities which would more accurately measure
a ﬁrm's market power over a particular individual. For example, ﬁrms likely face diﬀerent
supply elasticities for every occupation, and potentially diﬀerent elasticities across race and
gender groups. From a measurement error perspective, regressing the log of earnings on the
average labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm would attenuate the estimates relative to the ideal
scenario where I could separately identify every occupation speciﬁc elasticity. Nevertheless,
the measurement error present is unlikely to be of the magnitude necessary to attenuate the
estimate by more than half.
While these results are clear evidence that ﬁrm-level monopsony contributes to the gender
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pay gap, as has been documented on a less detailed scale by several other studies, these results
provide two key insights into the impact of imperfect competition on the gender pay gap.
First, on average, the gap between the male and female labor supply elasticities is quite
small within ﬁrms which employ a nontrivial number of both men and women. Instead, the
gap is primarily driven by disproportionate numbers of men (women) working at high (low)
elasticitiy ﬁrms. A second important contribution of this study is that ﬁrms do not utilize
all of the wage setting power available to them when it comes to the gender pay gap. The
results suggest that women would earn about 7.5 percent less than men, holding all else
constant, as a result of increased search frictions. However, I ﬁnd that these search frictions
only cost women about 3.3 percent of their earnings relative to their male counterparts (the
analagous statistics for ﬁrms which employ nontrivial workers of each gender are 2.0 and 0.9
percent respectively). Given the existence of pay equity laws and substantial social pressure
promoting gender equality, this result is not surprising. A similar point was ﬁrst made by
Bronfenbrenner (1956), which argued that ﬁrms likely possess substantial wage-setting power
but are unlikely to exercise all or most of it.
7 Conclusion
The gender pay gap is one of the most studied topics in modern labor economics. Despite this
intense focus, only recently have studies considered the impact that imperfect competition
in the labor market may have on the gender pay diﬀerential. Furthermore, due to data
constraints, the recent empirical studies which ﬁnd evidence of diﬀerent degrees of search
frictions between men and women are unable to directly estimate the impact of these frictions
on the gender pay gap.
This study uses linked employer-employee data to estimate the labor supply elasticity
facing the ﬁrm, separately by gender, for a comprehensive sample of U.S. ﬁrms. Using a
dynamic model of labor supply, which identiﬁes the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm oﬀ
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of job to job transitions, I ﬁnd evidence of substantial search frictions in the economy, with
females facing a higher level of frictions than males. However, the majority of the gender gap
in labor supply elasticities is driven by across ﬁrm sorting rather than within ﬁrm diﬀerences,
a feature predicted by the Bowlus (1997) equilibrium search model, but which has not been
previously documented.
On average, I ﬁnd that males face a labor supply elasticity 0.15 points higher than females,
a diﬀerential which leads to 2.0% lower earnings for women (or about 9% of the adjusted
gender earnings gap). However, this is slightly less than half of the theoretically implied
impact which the previous literature has been forced to rely upon.
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Part III
Labor Mobility and the Great Recession
Abstract
Using linked employer-employee data from the United States Census Bureau, I cal-
culate the impact of the Great Recession on labor market frictions. To generate these
measures, I use a dynamic model similar to that of Manning (2003) and estimate the
labor supply elasticity from job-to-job ﬂows. I estimate that the labor supply elasticity
to the ﬁrm declined by approximately 0.19 points (1.20 to 1.01) following the ﬁnancial
crisis of 2008. Furthermore, this decline cost workers about 2.4 percent in earnings.
I also ﬁnd evidence that relatively monopsonistic ﬁrms smooth their employment
behavior, growing at a rate lower than relatively competitive ﬁrms in good economic
climates and higher during poor economic climates. This conforms with the predictions
of recent macroeconomic search models which imply that frictions in the economy may
actually reduce employment ﬂuctuations.
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1 Introduction
The severe labor market downturn caused by the Great Recession is the worst seen by the
U.S. in seventy years. At its peak, the national unemployment rate was 10.6 percnet. The
average duration of unemployment reached 35 weeks, and nearly 1 in 6 workers lost their
job (Farber, 2011). Furthermore, recent work by Lazear and Spletzer (2012) highlights the
lack of labor market churning during this time period. Each of these factors implies that
the competition between ﬁrms for a given worker's services declined substantially during the
Great Recession. For many who lost their jobs, ﬁrms were competing with their reservation
wages (i.e. unemployment insurance) rather than with the wages of other ﬁrms.
Recent research (Manning, 2003; Hirsch et al., 2010; Ransom and Oaxaca, 2010; Webber,
2012) has highlighted both the prevalence and importance of frictions in the labor market
which lead to less than perfect mobility for workers. While this new literature, up to this
point, has been largely agnostic about the causes of these market frictions (assymetric infor-
mation, moving costs, low job oﬀer arrival rate, etc.) the conclusion that frictions exist has
been consistent.
Using linked employer-employee data from the U.S. Census Bureau, this paper estimates
the decline in labor market competition (as measured by the labor supply elasticity facing
the ﬁrm) which workers experienced during the Great Recession, and evaluates the impact
on earnings. Additionally, I examine the employment patterns of ﬁrms which compete in
more versus less competitive labor markets over the past decade, and how the labor supply
elasticity faced by an individual ﬁrm aﬀects its hiring behavior.
This study contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, it is the only study
to examine the time series variation in the labor supply elasticity for a comprehensive set
of ﬁrms between 1998 and 2011. The only previous paper to look at time series variation of
the labor supply elasticity, Depew and Sorensen (2011), did so for a single ﬁrm in the early
to mid 1900's. Second, this is the ﬁrst paper to compare the employment behavior (hires,
separations, growth, etc.) of ﬁrms in competitive versus monopsonistic labor markets.
72
I ﬁnd that the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm is procyclical, and that the average
elasticity faced by workers declined by about 16% from its peak (1.20) to a low of 1.01 in
late 2010. Based on a series of earnings regressions, this decline lead to earnings losses of
approximately 2.4 percent. I also ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences in the decline of labor market
competitiveness across industries.
I estimate that in a good economy, on average ﬁrms in monopsonistic labor markets have
lower growth rates than ﬁrms in relatively more competitive labor markets. I ﬁnd that this
is due to a higher separation rate rather than a lower hiring rate among monopsonistic ﬁrms.
Furthermore, I ﬁnd that during the Great Recession relatively monopsonistic ﬁrms had a
higher growth rate than relatively competitive ﬁrms. The results suggest that monopsonistic
ﬁrms are more able (due to their increased market power) to smooth their employment
behavior over the business cycle, implying that frictions in the economy may actually reduce
employment volatility. This conforms with the search model presented in Rogerson and
Shimer (2011).
The paper is organized as follows, Section 2 describes the previous literature on compe-
tition in the labor market. Section 3 lays out the theoretical foundation for this study. The
data and methods are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6
concludes.
2 Previous Literature
The concept of monopsony was ﬁrst deﬁned and explored as a model by Robinson (1933).
In her seminal work, Robinson formulated the analysis which is still taught in undergraduate
labor economics courses. Monopsony literally means one buyer, and although the term is
most often used in a labor market context, it can also refer to a ﬁrm which is the only buyer
of an input.
It should be pointed out that in the new monopsony framework, the word monopsony is
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synonymous with the following phrases: monopsonistic competition, imperfect competition,
ﬁnite labor supply elasticity, or upward sloping labor supply curve to the ﬁrm. While the
classic monopsony model is based on the idea of a single ﬁrm as the only outlet for which
workers can supply labor, the new framework deﬁnes monopsony as any departure from the
assumptions of perfect competition. Additionally, the degree of monopsonistic competition
may vary signiﬁcantly across labor markets, and even across ﬁrms within a given labor
market.
Many studies have provided suggestive evidence of an imperfectly competitive labor mar-
ket. The existence of signiﬁcant ﬁrm eﬀects in wage regressions, even after controlling for
detailed person and industry characteristics, is cited as strong suggestive evidence of ﬁrm
market power (Abowd et al., 1999; Goux and Maurin, 1999). For instance, Goux and Mau-
rin (1999) conclude that on average ﬁrm eﬀects alter an individual's wage by more than 20
percent. Furthermore, they ﬁnd these ﬁrm eﬀects are related more to ﬁrm characteristics
such as size rather than productivity, implying that the ﬁrm eﬀects are not simply absorbing
workers' unmeasured marginal product of labor.
A relatively new branch of labor economics which focuses on the initial labor market
conditions when a worker enters the labor market may also provide insight into the mobility
of workers. A number of studies (Oyer, 2006, 2008; Genda and Kondo, 2010; Kahn, 2010)
ﬁnd persistent and negative wage eﬀects from entering the labor market in a bad economy,
lasting for at least 20 years. Additionally, the negative long-term impact of being laid
oﬀ, found in studies such as Jacobson et al. (1993), can also be viewed as evidence of an
imperfectly competitive market. The persistent eﬀects found in all of these studies provide
further suggestive evidence of signiﬁcant long-run frictions in the labor market.
Most of the theoretical work done on this topic resides in the search theory literature,
with major contributions coming from Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Shimer (2005) to
name a few27. This line of research has given rise to a "new monopsony" literature, pop-
27See Mortensen (2003) or Rogerson et al. (2005) for a review of this literature
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ularized by Alan Manning's (Manning, 2003) careful analysis of labor-related topics absent
the assumption of perfect competition. The new monopsony model of the labor market
views a ﬁrm's market power as derived from search frictions rather than solely geographic
power as in a classic monopsony model. These search frictions originate from imperfections
in the labor market such as imperfect information about available jobs, worker immobility,
or heterogeneous preferences.
Even if the existence of monopsony power is accepted, estimating the degree of market
power possessed by a ﬁrm is not a simple task. Economists since Bunting (1962) have
searched for empirical evidence of monopsony, with the predominant method being the use
of concentration ratios, the share of a labor market which a given ﬁrm employs. The most
commonly examined market in the empirical monopsony literature has been that of nurses in
hospitals (Hurd, 1973; Feldman and Scheer, 1982; Hirsch and Schumacher, 1995; Link and
Landon, 1975; Adamache and Sloan, 1982; Link and Settle, 1979). This market lends itself
to monopsony because nurses have a highly speciﬁc form of human capital and there are
many rural labor markets where hospitals are the dominant employer. Despite the relatively
large literature on this narrow labor market, the concentration ratio approach has yielded
mixed results and no clear consensus.
More recently, studies have attempted to directly estimate the average slope of the labor
supply curve faced by the ﬁrm, which is a distinct concept from the market labor supply
elasticity28. Studying the market for nurses, Sullivan (1989) ﬁnds evidence of monopsony
using a structural approach to measure the diﬀerence between nurses' marginal product of
labor and their wages. Examining another market commonly thought to be monopsonistic,
the market for schoolteachers, Ransom and Sims (2010) instrument wages with collectively
bargained pay scales and estimate a labor supply elasticity between 3 and 4. In a novel
approach using German administrative data, Schmieder (2010) ﬁnds evidence of a positive
28The market labor supply elasticity corresponds to the decision of a worker to enter the labor force, while
the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm corresponds to the decision of whether to supply labor to a particular
ﬁrm. This paper focuses on the ﬁrm-level decision.
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sloping labor supply curve through an analysis of new establishments.
Using a dynamic approach similar to this study, Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) and Hirsch
et al. (2010) both separately estimate the labor supply elasticities to the ﬁrm of men and
women, each ﬁnding strong evidence of monopsonistic competition. Ransom and Oaxaca
(2010) use data from a chain of grocery stores, and ﬁnd labor supply elasticities of about
2.5 for men and 1.6 for women. Hirsch et al. (2010) uses administrative data from Germany
to estimate elasticities ranging from 2.5-3.6 and 1.9-2.5 for men and women respectively.
Applying this approach to survey data, Manning (2003) ﬁnds labor supply elasticities ranging
from 0.68 in the NLSY to 1.38 in the PSID. In a developing country context, Brummund
(2011) uses a novel structural production function approach, and ﬁnds strong evidence of
monopsony in Indonesian labor markets, estimating labor supply elasticities between 0.6 and
1.0.
Depew and Sorensen (2011) derive a time-varying measure of the labor supply elasticity
to the ﬁrm, and analyze the cyclicality of Ford's labor supply elasticity in the early to mid
1900's.Webber (2012), the closest analogue to this study, uses linked employer employee
data from the U.S. Census Bureau and an extended dynamic labor supply model to study
ﬁrm-level monopsony. Webber (2012) is the ﬁrst to estimate a comprehensive set of labor
supply elasticities at the ﬁrm-level, calculting an average worker-weighted elasticity of 1.08,
and is also the ﬁrst to demonstrate the link between ﬁrm-level elasticities and the earnings
of workers.
Little theoretical work has been done regarding the impact of labor market frictions
over the business cycle, however, a recent search model presented in Rogerson and Shimer
(2011) is of particular relevance to this study. Their model suggests that the presence of
search frictions in an economy reduces the ﬂuctuations in employment because ﬁrms are
less constrained to follow the rest of the economy, and choose to smooth their employment
behavior to save on potentially costly labor adjustment costs.
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3 Theoretical Model
A central feature of perfect competition is the law of one wage, that all workers of equal
ability should be paid the same market clearing wage. In an attempt to explain how wage
dispersion can indeed be an equilibrium outcome, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) develop a
model of the economy in which employers post wages based on the wage-posting behavior
of competing employers. Even assuming equal ability for all workers, wage dispersion is an
equilibrium outcome as long as one assumes that the arrival rate of job oﬀers is positive
but ﬁnite (perfect competition characterizes the limiting case, as the arrival rate tends to
inﬁnity). While I do not explicity estimate the Burdett and Mortensen model in this paper,
the intuition of monopsony power derived from search frictions is central to this study. See
Kuhn (2004) for a critique of the use of equilibrium search models in a monopsony context.
The Burdett and Mortensen model of equilibrium wage dispersion
Assume there are Mt equally productive workers (where productivity is given by p), each
gaining utility b from leisure. Further assume there are Me constant returns to scale ﬁrms
which are inﬁnitesimally small when compared to the entire economy. A ﬁrm sets wage w
to maximize steady-state proﬁts pi = (p-w)N(w) where N(w) represents the supply of labor
to the ﬁrm. Also deﬁne F(w) as the cdf of wage oﬀers observed in the economy, and f(w) is
the corresponding pdf. All workers within a ﬁrm must be paid the same wage. Employed
workers will accept a wage oﬀer w' if it is greater than their current wage w, and non-
employed workers will accept w' if w'=b where b is their reservation wage. Wage oﬀers are
drawn randomly from the distribution F(w), and arrive to all workers at rate λ. Assume
an exogenous job destruction rate δ, and that all workers leave the job market at rate δ
to be replaced in nonemployment by an equivalent number of workers. RN denotes The
recruitment ﬂow and separation rate functions are given by:
R(w) = RN + λ
∫ w
0
f(x)N(x)dx (38)
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s(w) = δ + λ(1− F (w)) (39)
Burdett and Mortensen (1998), or alternatively Manning (2003), show that in this econ-
omy, as long as λ is positive and ﬁnite, there will be a nondegenerate distribution of wages
even when all workers are equally productive. As λ tends to zero, the wage distribution will
collapse to the monopsony wage, which in this particular economy would be the reservation
wage b. As λ tends to inﬁnity the wage distribution will collapse to the perfectly competitive
wage, the marginal product of labor p.
Note that the following primarily relies on the model presented in Manning (2003), and
incorporates a key insight from the recent working paper by Depew and Sorensen (2011) to
derive the least restrictive formula for the labor supply elasticity facing the ﬁrm currently in
the literature. We can recursively formulate the supply of labor to a ﬁrm with the following
equation, where R(w) is the ﬂow of recruits to a ﬁrm and s(w) is the separation rate.
Nt(w) = Nt−1(w)[1− st−1(w)] +Rt−1(w) (40)
Equation (40) formalizes the deﬁnitionally true statement that a ﬁrm's employment this
period is equal to the fraction of workers from last period who stay with the ﬁrm plus the
number of new recruits. Noting that Nt = γNt−1 where γ is the rate of employment growth
between period t-1 and t, we can rewrite Equation (40) as
Nt(w) =
Rt(w)
1− (1− st(w)) 1γt
(41)
Taking the natural log of each side, multiplying by w, and diﬀerentiating we can write the
elasticity of labor supply, ε, at time t as a function of the long-run elasticities of recruitment
and separations, as well as the contemporary separation and growth rates.
εt = εR − εS st(w)
γt + st(w)− 1 (42)
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We can further decompose the recruitment and separation elasticities in the following
way
εt = θ
RεER + (1− θR)εNR − θSεES
sEt (w)
γt + sEt (w)− 1
− (1− θS)εNS
sNt (w)
γt + sNt (w)− 1
(43)
Where the elasticity of recruitment has been broken down into the elasticity of recruit-
ment of workers from employment (εER) and the elasticity of recruitment of workers from
nonemployment (εNR ). Similarly the elasticity of separation has been decomposed into the
elasticity of separation to employment (εES ) and the elasticity of separation to nonemploy-
ment (εNS ). θ
Rand θS represent the share of recruits from employment and the share of
separations to employment respectively.
While there are established methods for estimating separation elasticities with standard
job-ﬂow data, recruitment elasticities are not identiﬁed without detailed information about
every job oﬀer a worker receives. Therefore, it would be helpful to express the elasticities of
recruitment from employment and noemployment as functions of estimable quantities.
Looking ﬁrst at the elasticity of recruitment from employment, we can write the recruit-
ment from employment function and its derivative as
RE(w) = λ
∫ w
0
f(x)N(x)dx (44)
∂RE(w)
∂w
= λf(w)N(w) (45)
Combining Equations (41), (44), and (45), along with the deﬁnition of an elasticity
(εER =
w
RE(w)
∂RE(w)
∂w
), we get:
εER =
wλf(w)
1 +
sEt (w)
γt
− 1
γt
(46)
In dealing with the numerator, note that the the derivative of the separation to employ-
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ment function, sE(w) = λ(1− F (w)), is
∂sE(w)
∂w
= −λf(w) (47)
Combining equations (46), (47), and the deﬁnition of an elasticity (εEs =
w
sE(w)
∂sE(w)
∂w
), we
can write the elasticity of recruitment from employment as a function of estimable quantities:
εER =
−εES sEt (w)
1 +
sEt (w)
γt
− 1
γt
(48)
Next, Manning (2003, p. 100) notes that the elasticity of recruitment from nonemploy-
ment can be written as
εNR = ε
E
R − wθ‘R(w)/θR(w)(1− θR(w)) (49)
This is derived from the simple deﬁnition of θR, the share of total recruits which come
from employment, which implies RN = RE(1 − θR)/θR, where RN and RE are the recruits
from nonemployment and employment respectively. Taking the natural log of each side of
this relation and diﬀerentiating yields the relation depicted in Equation (49). The second
term on the right-hand side of Equation (49) can be thought of as the bargaining premium
that an employee receives from searching while currently employed. Thus, the labor supply
elasticity to the ﬁrm can be written as a function of both separation elasticities, the premium
to searching while employed, and the calculated separation and growth rates.
4 Data and Methodology
Data
The Longitudinal Employer Household whichDynamics (LEHD) data are built primarily
from Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records, which cover approximately 98 percent of
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wage and salary payments in private sector non-farm jobs. Information about the ﬁrms is
constructed from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). The LEHD
infrastructure allows users to follow both workers and ﬁrms over time, as well as to identify
workers who share a common employer. Firms in these data are deﬁned at the state level,
which means that a Walmart in Florida and a Walmart in Georgia would be considered
to be diﬀerent ﬁrms. However, all Walmarts in Florida are considered to be part of the
same ﬁrm. These data also include demographic characteristics of the worker and basic ﬁrm
characteristics, obtained through administrative record and statistical links. For a complete
description of these data, see Abowd et al. (2009).
There are two distinct samples I will use in this study. First, I use a set of employment
spells coming from many diﬀerent ﬁrms to obtain estimates of the labor supply elasticity
for each ﬁrm. This sample is constructed in a similar way to Webber (2012) (although the
sample is slightly diﬀerent because this study uses fewer states, but more years of data). The
second sample, also the analysis sample, is the set of ﬁrms for which a labor supply elasticity
is estimated.
The sample of employment spells consists of quarterly observations on earnings and
employment for 31 states between 1998 and 201129. I make several sample restrictions in an
attempt to obtain the most economically meaningful results. These restrictions are necessary
in large part because the earnings data are derived from tax records, and thus any payment
made to an individual, no matter how small, will appear in the sample. As a consequence,
there are many job spells which appear to last only one quarter, but are in fact one-time
payments which do not conform with the general view of a job match between a ﬁrm and
worker.
First, I only include an employment spell in the sample if at some point it could be
considered the dominant job, deﬁned as paying the highest wage of an individual's jobs in
29The states in my sample are ak, az, co, ca, ﬂ, ga, hi, id, il, in, ks, ky, la, md, me, mn, mo, mt, nc, nj,
nm, ny, or, pa, ri, sd, tx, wa, wi, wv, and wy. These were chosen to have a consistent panel of states for all
years of my sample (16 other states do not enter the LEHD infrastructure until after 1998).
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a given quarter30. I also remove all spells which span fewer than three quarters.31 This
sample restriction is related to the construction of the earnings variable. Since the data
do not contain information on when in the quarter an individual was hired/separated, the
entries for the ﬁrst and last quarters of any employment spell will almost certainly under-
estimate the quarterly earnings rate (unless the individual was hired on the ﬁrst day or
left employment on the last day of a quarter). Thus, in order to get an accurate measure-
ment of the earnings rate I must observe an individual in at least one quarter other than
the ﬁrst or last of an employment spell. I remove job spells which have average earnings
greater than $1 million per quarter and less than $100 per quarter, which corresponds ap-
proximately to the top and bottom 1 percent of observations. Additionally, only ﬁrms which
have greater than 25 separations to employment, 25 separations to unemployment, and 25
recruits from employment over the lifespan of the ﬁrm are considered, this is done to ensure
there is suﬃcient data to estimate the relevant elasticities. This reduces the analysis sample
to approximately 132,062,000 unique individuals having 260.939,000 employment spells at
308,000 unique ﬁrms.
Empirical Strategy
The construction of the labor supply elasticity measures used in this study most closely
represents an augmented ﬁrm-level implementation of the methodology proposed in Manning
(2003).
I ﬁrst describe in detail how the labor supply elasticity measures are calculated, followed
by a description of how they are used to examine ﬁrms' employment behavior.
30This formulation allows an individual to have more than one dominant job in a given quarter. The
rationale behind this deﬁnition is that I wish to include all job spells where the wage is important to the
worker. The vast majority of job spells in my sample, 89.9 percent, have 0 or 1 quarters of overlap with
other job spells. Restricting the dominant job deﬁnition to only allow one dominant job at a given time does
not alter the reported results.
31The relaxation of this assumption does not appreciably alter any of the reported results.
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Dynamic Measure
The simplest way to estimate the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm would be to regress
the natural log of ﬁrm size on the natural log of ﬁrm wages. However, even when control-
ling for various demographic characteristics, this is deemed to produce a potentially biased
estimate32. I therefore rely on estimating parameters presented in the theoretical section
which are plausibly identiﬁed, and then combine them using results from Manning (2003)
and equation (43) to produce an estimate of the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm.
To my knowledge, only Hirsch et al. (2010) has used a similar, but considerably more
restrictive, method with administrative data which yielded an economy-wide estimate of the
average labor supply curve facing the ﬁrm. Manning (2003) also estimates an economy-wide
measure of the degree of monopsony using surveys such as the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY) 1979. One of the major contributions of this paper is that I estimate
the labor supply elasticities for each ﬁrm, rather than the average over the whole economy.
Additionally, these prior studies imposed a steady-state assumption on their model, which
the model in this paper does not impose. Estimating the labor supply elasticities at the ﬁrm
level does have several advantages. First, the estimation of each of the elasticity components
is much more ﬂexible than even the least constrained speciﬁcations of Hirsch et al. (2010).
Second, I am able to use the measures as an explanatory variable, and can test a number
of diﬀerent models. Finally, I am able to examine the eﬀect of market power on earnings at
each point in the market power distribution, rather than examining only the average eﬀect.
This is particularly important because theory predicts signiﬁcant nonlinear eﬀects relating to
the labor supply elasticity and a ﬁrm's ability to mark down wages (Pigou, 1924). However,
this strategy has the drawback that I am unable to estimate the relevant parameters, and
thus the labor supply elasticity, for the smallest ﬁrms (sample restrictions are discussed in
the data section).
32The ﬁrm size-wage premium is a well known result in the labor economics literature, and is often
attributed to non-monopsony related factors such as economies of scale increasing the productivity, and thus
the marginal product, of workers at large ﬁrms
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According to the results presented in the theoretical model section, three quantities
must be estimated in order to construct the labor supply elasticity measure, (εES , ε
N
S and
wθR
′
(w)/θR(w)(1− θR(w))), as well as the calculated separation and growth rates for each
ﬁrm. Each of the following models will be run separately for every ﬁrm in the sample (as
well as on the whole sample for comparison purposes), where the unit of observation is an
employment spell, thus one individual can appear in multiple ﬁrm's models. Looking ﬁrst
at the separation elasticities, I model separations to nonemployment as a Cox proportional
hazard model given by
λN(t|βN,seplog(earnings)i +XiγN,sep) = λ0(t) exp(βN,seplog(earnings)i +XiγN,sep) (50)
where λ() is the hazard function, λ0 is the baseline hazard, t is the length of employment,
log(earnings) is the natural log of individual i's average quarterly earnings,33 and X is a vector
of explanatory variables including gender, race, age, education, and year control variables.
While the entire sample is used, workers who transition to a new employer or who are with
the same employer at the end of the data series are considered to have a censored employment
spell. In this model, the parameter β represents an estimate of the separation elasticity to
nonemployment. In an analogous setting, I model separations to employment as
λE(t|βE,seplog(earnings)
i
+Xiγ
E,sep) = λ0(t) exp(β
E,seplog(earnings)i +Xiγ
E,sep) (51)
with the only diﬀerence being that the sample is restricted to those workers who do not
have a job transition to nonemployment. As before, β represents an estimate of the sepa-
ration elasticity to employment. To estimate the third quantity needed for equation (43),
33As mentioned above, this measure excludes the ﬁrst and last quarters of a job spell. Alternative measures
of earnings have also been used, such as the last observed (full) quarter of earnings, with no substantial
diﬀerence in the estimated elasticities.
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wθ‘R(w)/θR(w)(1− θR(w)), Manning (2003) shows that this is equivalent to the coeﬃcient
on log earnings when estimating the following logistic regression
Prec =
exp(βE,reclog(earnings)i +Xiγ
E,rec)
1 + exp(βE,reclog(earnings)i +XiγE,rec)
(52)
where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if a worker was recruited from employment
and 0 if they were recruited from nonemployment. To enable this coeﬃcient to vary over
time, log earnings is interacted with time dummies. The same explanatory variables used
in the separation equations are used in this logistic regression. At this point the results
listed in the theoretical section can be used (along with calculating the share of recruits and
separations to employment, separation rates, and growth rates for each ﬁrm) in conjunction
with equation (43) to produce an estimate of the labor supply elasticity facing each ﬁrm. 34
To provide some intuition on the models being estimated, consider the analysis of sepa-
rations to employment. A large (in absolute value) coeﬃcient on the log earnings variable
implies that a small decrease in an individual's earnings will greatly increase the probability
of separating in any given period. In a perfectly competitive economy, we would expect
this coeﬃcient to be inﬁnitely high. Similarly, a very small coeﬃcient implies that the em-
ployer can lower the wage rate without seeing a substantial decline in employment. One
concern with this procedure is that this measure of monopsony power is actually proxying
for high-wage ﬁrms, reﬂecting an eﬃciency wage view of the economy where ﬁrms pay a
wage considerably above the market wage in exchange for lower turnover. This is much
more of a concern in the full economy estimate of the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm
found elsewhere in the literature than in my ﬁrm-level estimation since the models in this
paper are run separately by ﬁrm. The logic behind this diﬀerence is that in the full economy
model cross-sectional variation in the level of earnings is used to identify the labor supply
34Each equation was also estimated with an indicator variable for whether the employment spell was in
progress at the beginning of the data window to correct for potential bias of truncated records. Additionally,
all models were reestimated using only job spells for which the entire job spell was observed, with no
substantial diﬀerences observed betweeen these models.
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elasticity. In a ﬁrm-speciﬁc model, however, the labor supply elasticity of ﬁrm A does not
mechanically depend on the level of earnings at ﬁrm B. This eﬃciency wage hypothesis will
be directly tested.
Analysis
The labor supply elasticity estimates described above are used in several analyses to examine
the interaction of imperfect competition and the Great Recession.
First, a set of earnings regressions are run to assess the impact of a reduced labor supply
elasticity during the recession on workers' earnings. Explicitly, I estimate :
log(quarterly earningsij) = βelasticityj + γXij + δYj + θZi + εij (53)
The dependent variable is the natural log of individual i's quarterly earnings in employ-
ment spell j. The elasticity variable represents ﬁrm j's estimated labor supply elasticity.
X is a vector of person and ﬁrm characteristics, which may vary by the employment spell,
including age, age-squared, tenure (quarters employed at ﬁrm), tenure-squared, education35,
gender, race, ethnicity, year eﬀects, indicator variables for the two-digit NAICS sector, and
the size (employment) of the ﬁrm. Y is a vector of ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, Z is a vector of person
ﬁxed-eﬀects, and ε is the error term. Time-invariant characteristics in X are excluded in
models with person or ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects.
Using the ﬁrm-level sample, I then model the impact of a ﬁrm's labor supply elasticity
on the employment behavior (growth rate, hiring rate, separation rate) of the ﬁrm across
the business cycle. I estimate variations of the following equation:
35Reported educational attainment is only available for about 15 percent of the sample, although sophis-
ticated imputations of education are available for the entire sample. The results presented in this paper
correspond the the full sample of workers (reported education and imputed education). All models were also
run on the sample with no imputed data, and no substantive diﬀerences were observed. In particular, since
the preferred speciﬁcation includes person ﬁxed-eﬀects, and thus educational attainment drops out of the
model, this is of little concern.
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Ratejt = βelasticityj + γQuartert + δElasticity ∗Quarterjt + θXjt + εjt (54)
The dependent variable represents the growth, separation, or hiring rate of ﬁrm j in
quarter t. Elasticity is ﬁrm j's long run labor supply elasticity (the time-varying elasticity
is not used because the separation and growth rates are explicitly part of the time-varying
model). The model also includes quarter ﬁxed efects, quarter*elasticity interactions, and a
set of control variables X (ﬁrm-level averages of gender, education groupings, race, ethnicity,
age, industry, and employment). To ensure that extreme outliers do not inﬂuence the results,
only ﬁrm's with labor supply elasticities below 5 (about 95 percent of the data) are included
in the regressions.
5 Results
Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 reports both employment spell and ﬁrm-level summary statistics. Since the unit
of observation is the employment spell rather than the individual, and only dominant jobs
are included, some statistics deviate slightly from typical observational studies of the labor
market (such as a nearly even split of job spells between men and women). The average
employment spell lasts about two and a half years, with more than sixty percent of spells
resulting from a move from another job. The quarterly nature of the LEHD data make it
diﬃcult to precisely identify36 whether an individual separated to employment or nonem-
ployment, and therefore the proportion of separations to employment is slightly higher than
comparable statistics reported in Manning (2003).
36The deﬁnition used in this paper requires an individual to have no reported earnings for an entire quarter
following an employment spell to be deﬁned as a separation to nonemployment, with all other separations
coded as a separation to employment. This deﬁnition was chosen because it lead to the most conservative
(least monopsonistic) results, although the diﬀerences were small. The other methods tried involved imputing
the time during the quarter at which employment stopped/started based on a comparison of the earnings
reported in the last/ﬁrst quarter to a quarter in which I know the individual worked the entire quarter.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev
Unit of Observation: Employment Spell
Age 38 15.2
Female 0.5 0.5
White 0.77 0.42
Hispanic 0.14 0.34
< High School 0.14 0.34
High School Diploma 0.29 0.45
Some College 0.32 0.47
College Degree+ 0.25 0.43
Tenure (Quarters) 10.1 10.7
Log(Quarterly Earnings) 8.5 1
Separation Rate 0.18 0.15
Hiring Rate 0.17 0.14
Recruited from Employment 0.64 0.48
Observations 260,939,000
Unit of Observation: Firm-Year-Quarter
Firm Hires per Quarter 493 1592
Firm Employment 2962 10772
Employment Growth Rate 1.01 0.15
Observations 11,137,000
The average ﬁrm in my sample employs nearly 3000 workers and hires almost 500 in a
given quarter. Several qualiﬁcations must be made for these statistics. First, the distribu-
tions are highly skewed, with the median ﬁrm employing only 400 and hiring 75 in a given
quarter. Second is that statistics are not point in time estimates, but rather totals through-
out an entire quarter. Finally, remember that these are at the ﬁrm (state-level) rather than
at the establishement (individual unit) level.
Monopsony over the Business Cycle
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 present information about the elasticities estimated through Equa-
tions (50)-(52). Since the results in these tables are quite similar to those of Webber (2012)
I will not spend much time describing them. The ﬁrst four columns of Table 3.2 report the
average ﬁrm-level elasticities of recruitment from employment and nonemployment, and the
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separation elasticities to employment and nonemployment respectively. The ﬁnal column
combines these elasticities, along with the calculated shares of separations/recruits to/from
employment to obtain the labor supply elasticity. The ﬁrst three rows report only the long-
run elasticities, while the ﬁnal row describes the elasticities when each quantitiy is allowed
to vary over time. As shown in Table 3.3, I estimate a mean (worker-weighted) labor supply
elasticity of 1.17.
Table 3.2: Firm-Level Labor Supply Elasticities
Model εER ε
N
R ε
E
S ε
N
S ε
Earnings Only 0.42 0.1 -0.42 -0.55 0.85
Full Model 0.47 0.11 -0.47 -0.62 0.96
Full Model
(Time-Varying)
0.57 0.14 -0.57 -0.75 1.17
The ﬁrst row represents estimates from equations (50)-(52) where the only regressor in
each model is log earnings. The second row estimates the same equations, and includes
age, age-squared, along with indicator variables for female, nonwhite, Hispanic, education
category controls, and year eﬀects. Employer controls include number of employees
working at the ﬁrm and industry indicator variables. The ﬁrst four columns report the
average ﬁrm-level elasticities of recruitment from employment and nonemployment, and
the separation elasticities to employment and nonemployment respectively. The ﬁnal
column combines these elasticities, along with the calculated shares of
separations/recruits to/from employment, separation rates, and growth rates to obtain
the labor supply elasticity. The ﬁrst two rows report only the long-run elasticities, while
the third row describes the elasticities when a steady-state is not assumed, and they are
allowed to vary over time.
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Table 3.3: Distribution of Estimated Firm-Level Labor Supply Elasticities
Percentiles
Mean 10th 525th 50th 75th 90th
1.17 0.26 0.5 0.85 1.35 2.13
*Three separate regressions, corresponding to equations (50)-(52), were
estimated separately for each ﬁrm in the data which met the conditions
described in the data section. The coeﬃcients on log earnings in each
regression were combined, weighted by the share of recruits and separations
to employment, separation rates, and growth rates according to equation
(43) to obtain the estimate of the labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm.
Demographic and human capital controls include: age, age-squared, and
indicator variables for gender, ethnicity, racial status, and education level.
Employer controls include number of employees working at the ﬁrm and
industry indicator variables. Year eﬀects are included in all models.
Figure 3.1 plots the labor supply elasticity between 1998 and 2011 for the 31 states
enumerated in the Data section. For the late 1990's and early 2000's, the labor supply
elasticity to the ﬁrm ﬂuctuated mostly between 1.15 and 1.20, with a peak of 1.20 occuring
in 2005 quarter 1.01. The ﬁnancial crisis in 2008 produced a clear and prolonged downturn
in the labor supply elasticity facing the ﬁrm, with the low point coming in 2010 quarter 4.
Figure 3.1: The Labor Supply Elasticity to the Firm Over Time
But what does this mean in terms of worker welfare? Theoretically, a decline in the
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labor supply elasticity from 1.19 to 1 leads to earnings losses of 8.7 percent37. To test the
impact empirical impact of this decline, Table 3.4 presents a series of earnings regressions
to assess the impact of a change in the labor supply elasticity. The model with the most
detailed controls (person and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects) suggests that the decline of the labor supply
elasticity from 1.19 to 1.00 led to earnings losses of 2.4 percentage points.
37Based on the proﬁt-maximizing condition w = pQ
′(L)
1+ 1ε
where represent the wage, the numerator is the
marginal product of labor, and epsilon is the elasticity.
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Table 3.4: Impact of Search Frictions on Earnings
Coeﬃcient on
labor supply
elasticity
0.14 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.12
Demographic
controls
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employer controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State ﬁxed-eﬀects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Person
ﬁxed-eﬀects
No No No No No Yes No
Firm
ﬁxed-eﬀects
No No No No No No Yes
R-Squared 0.005 0.238 0.312 0.331 0.338 0.784 0.90
*A pooled national sample of all dominant employment spells subject to the
sample restriction described in the data section is used in this set of regressions.
The dependent variable is the natural log of quarterly earnings. Demographic
controls include: age, age-squared, and indicator variables for gender, ethnicity,
racial status, and education level. Employer controls include the number of
employees working at the ﬁrm and industry indicator variables. Tenure controls
include the length (in quarters) of the employment spell, as well as its squared
term. Year eﬀects are included in all models. These results are unweighted,
however all models were also estimated with demographic weights constructed by
the author. There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the weighted and
unweighted models. Standard errors are not reported because the t-statistics
range from 500-1000, but are available upon request along with all other estimated
coeﬃcients. There are 267,310,000 observations in each speciﬁcation.
Table 3.5 shows the diﬀerential change in the labor supply elasticity facing the ﬁrm
across various industries. The table reports the labor supply elasticity at its peak and
trough for each North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) sector. Profes-
sional/scientiﬁc/technical services experienced the greatest (percentage) decline (24 percent).
On the other end of the spectrum, accomodation/food services saw relatively mild declines in
competition (4 percent). Skill-biased technological change may be able to partially explain
the relative declines for these industries.
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Table 3.5: Mean Labor Supply Elasticity by NAICS Sector
NAICS Sector Mean Labor
Supply Elasticity
2005 Q1
Mean Labor
Supply Elasticity
2010 Q4
Agriculture 1.31 1.10
Mining/Oil/Natural Gas 1.60 1.28
Utilities 1.40 1.22
Construction 1.59 1.27
Manufacturing 1.72 1.40
Wholesale Trade 1.52 1.26
Resale Trade 1.07 0.95
Transportation 1.45 1.20
Information 1.22 0.98
Finance and Insurance 1.38 1.12
Real Estate and Rental 1.13 0.94
Profession/Scientiﬁc/Technical
Services
1.30 0.98
Management of Companies 1.00 0.87
Administrative Support 0.97 0.86
Educational Services 0.96 0.85
Health Care and Social Assistance 0.87 0.75
Arts and Entertainment 0.93 0.75
Accommodation and Food Services 0.96 0.89
Other Services 1.19 1.00
Public Administration 1.11 0.96
*The numbers in this table represent averages by NAICS sector of the
estimated labor supply elasticity to the ﬁrm. Three separate regressions,
corresponding to equations (50)-(52), were estimated separately for each ﬁrm
in the data which met the conditions described in the data section. The
coeﬃcients on log earnings in each regression were combined, weighted by the
share of recruits and separations to employment, separation rates, and
growth rates according to equation (43) to obtain the estimate of the labor
supply elasticity to the ﬁrm. Demographic and human capital controls
include: age, age-squared, and indicator variables for gender, ethnicity, racial
status, and education level. Employer controls include number of employees
working at the ﬁrm. Year eﬀects are included in all models.
Table 3.6 displays results from estimating Equation (54) using the ﬁrm's growth, sepa-
ration, and hiring rates as dependent variables. I present results for speciﬁcations with and
without ﬁrm and demographic controls, however since many of these controls (such as indus-
try or ﬁrm size) can be seen as causing a ﬁrm's monopsony power they may be considered
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bad controls. Therefore, in the text I only discuss the results for speciﬁcations without these
controls.
On average, I ﬁnd that ﬁrms in more competitive labor markets have higher rates of
growth, with a one unit increase in the labor supply elasticity being associated with a 0.4
percentage point increase in the growth rate. Decomposing the growth rate into hiring and
separation rates, I ﬁnd that this diﬀerence is driven by the separation rate. While both the
hiring and separation rates are lower for monopsonistic ﬁrms, the change in the separation
rate is greater for monopsonistic ﬁrms than it is for ﬁrms in more competitive markets, thus
explaining the diﬀerence in growth rates.
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Table 3.6: Employment Behavior and the Labor Supply Elasticity
Growth Rate Hiring Rate Separation Rate
No
Controls
Controls No
Controls
Controls No
Controls
Controls
Coeﬃcient .004 .005 -.022 -.013 -.025 -.016
The results represent the coeﬃcient on labor supply elasticity when
estimating Equation (54) at the ﬁrm levelboth with and without ﬁrm
and demographic controls. Coeﬃcients for each of the other elasticity
and year-quarter interaction are used in calculations described in the
text, and are available upon request. Approximately 11,137,000
ﬁrm-year-quarter observations are used in these models.
Figure 3.2 plots the (smoothed) predicted quarterly growth rates for ﬁrms at the median
and 90th percentile of the labor supply elasticity distribution. These predicted values are
obtained by estimating Equation (54) and using the interactions between the year-quarter
ﬁxed eﬀects and the labor supply elasticity. Prior to the ﬁnancial crisis, the growth rate for
the (monopsonistic) median ﬁrm was consistently below that of more competitive ﬁrms, stay-
ing relatively close to 1, and thus not expanding or contracting. However, during the Great
Recession there is a convergence of the growth rates between monopsonistic and competitive
ﬁrms, which persists to the end of the current data series.
Figure 3.2: Competitive and Monopsonistic Quarterly Growth Rates
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Figures 3.3 and 3.4 plot the predicted hiring and separation rates for the median and
90th percentile ﬁrms in the labor supply elasticity distribution. These ﬁgures show that the
convergence in growth rates between monopsonistic and competitive ﬁrms is primarily due to
changes in the relative separation rates. Over the period from 1998 quarter 1 to 2008 quarter
3, the disparity in hiring rates between the median and 90th percentile ﬁrm is .0275, and from
2008 quarter 4 onward it increased to .030. However, the separation rate diﬀerential in the
period prior to the ﬁnancial crisis is .0313 while the diﬀerential in the latter period decreased
to .0263. This leads to a growth rate diﬀerential of .0046 in the period prior to the ﬁnancial
crisis, and a growth rate diﬀerential of -.0015 after the ﬁnancial crisis. Intuitively, these
results imply that in the (mostly) strong economic times in the decade prior to the ﬁnancial
crisis ﬁrms facing a relatively competitive supply curve grew about 0.46% in employment
more per quarter than the median ﬁrm which faces a monopsonistic supply curve. However,
in the period after the ﬁnancial crisis hit, monopsonistic ﬁrms had a higher (or less negative)
growth rate than their more competitive counterparts.
Figure 3.3: Competitive and Monopsonistic Quarterly Hiring Rates
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Figure 3.4: Competitive and Monopsonistic Quarterly Separation Rates
Taken together this evidence points to the conclusion that ﬁrms facing relatively monop-
sonistic labor supply curves attempt to smooth their employment to a greater degree than
ﬁrms in relatively more competitive markets. While not testable with the currently available
data, this is consistent with a model where training or other adjustment costs are an impor-
tant determinant of ﬁrm behavior. In strong economic times, monopsonistic ﬁrms have lower
employment than competitive ﬁrms, which is predicted by the neoclassical monopsony model
(analagous to a monopoly which produces a lower output than a perfectly competitive ﬁrm).
However, in bad economic times, the monopsonist would prefer to keep employment more
steady (and are able to do so because of their increased market power) because they would
rather not bear signiﬁcant adjustment costs once the market conditions improve, conforming
with the predictions of the Rogerson and Shimer (2011) model.
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6 Conclusion
This study ﬁnds evidence that the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 lead to a substantial increase in the
search frictions which lead to an imperfectly competitive labor market. Using data from the
Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) infrastructure, I use a dynamic model
approach similar to that of Manning (2003) to identify ﬁrm level labor supply elasticities oﬀ
of job-to-job transitions. I ﬁnd that the average (worker-weighted) labor supply elasticity
facing the ﬁrm dropped from a peak of 1.19 in 2005 to a low point of 1.00 in the fourth
quarter of 2010. Based on a series of earnings regressions, this decline led to earnings losses
of approximately 2.4 percent. I also ﬁnd heterogeneity across industries in the decline of the
labor supply elasticity, with scientiﬁc/technical services being the most aﬀected industry.
I also ﬁnd evidence that the existence of frictions in the economy may lead to fewer
ﬂuctuations in the employment behavior of ﬁrms. I ﬁnd that relatively monopsonistic ﬁrms
attempt to smooth their employment adjustment, growing at a lower rate than relatively
competitive ﬁrms in strong economic climates but a higher growth rate in bad economic
climates.
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